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Pakistan’s Special Service Group Commandos were undertaking the same task, but were late by a few days and lost the battle to the snow warriors.

It was August of 1986 when the Chinese quietly occupied the ridges overlooking the Sumdorong Chu area at the Line of Actual Control bordering India and China. In response, India airlifted a full brigade of snow-trained troops to Zimithang just north of Tawang town in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh.

This eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation lasted a few years and then diplomacy took over. If India did not have snow-trained troops at the ready, the Chinese would have been at Tawang once again.

India also has troops specialized in jungle warfare and counter-insurgency operations. The Pakistani occupation of Kargil in Kashmir in February 1999 in the middle of winter was a big mistake. Their temporary success was quickly turned into defeat by India’s high-altitude and snow-warfare trained troops.

The Indian Army since 1962 has become proficient in mountain, snow and jungle warfare. Eight mountain divisions with an average strength of 15,000 men were created immediately after 1962. They defend India’s northern border including positions along the Line of Control with Pakistan in Kashmir.

The force is supplemented with four additional mountain divisions. All twelve new divisions have the capability to negotiate and confront the enemy at high altitudes. Of this force, two divisions are trained as strike forces, similar to those the Chinese used in 1962 to cross into India and surround areas of Tawang, Sela and Bomdila.

India trains its snow troops by positioning them at high altitudes, which help them to acclimatize to the rarefied atmosphere and build their stamina. Training is provided in highly specialized schools. Pre-eminent among them is the High Altitude Commando Training School at Tawang, located at 15,000 feet above sea level and ideal for the purpose. It also gives troops and officers an idea of the conditions on the Indo-China border.

Another eminent training ground for snow warriors is the High Altitude Warfare School near Sonamarg in Kashmir. Russia and the United States are aware of this school and their troops have received training there before being dispatched to fight high-altitude warfare in the Caucasus and Afghanistan.

Much of the Siachen Glacier occupation scheme by the Indian Army was perfected at the school. Besides, a host of the Indian Army’s operations to counter infiltration across the Line of Control at high altitudes are perfected here before taking to the field.

The Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School at Vairengte in the Indian state of Mizoram is another prestigious school that has trained close to 150,000 Indian soldiers and 5,000 foreign soldiers from 26 different countries. The school’s motto is “fight a guerilla like a guerilla.”

At Siachen, where guns freeze at minus 40 degrees Celsius, humans suffer much more from exposure. Five-layered clothing is routine for soldiers. It is sometimes insufficient, but the best available.

In Ladakh, regular patrols mounted in sub-zero temperatures let the Chinese know that the Indian troops are watching their every move. They also wear five-layered clothing and carry special weapons.

The best means to transport troops, supplies and reinforcements during troubled times to remote locations is by helicopter, and India has a large fleet. To avoid falling behind in technology and replacing old and aging machines, India is procuring 22 very modern attack helicopters and 15 transport helicopters for heavy lift. This is in addition to purchases of 200 light-combat helicopters.

Troops located at high altitudes are dependent upon helicopters for supplies and personnel. A number of secure helipads have been built in most locations that act as forward supply transshipment points. Some 100 more are planned for areas next to defensive positions in border regions.

Roads are harder to build around peaks and valleys, which are in abundance on the Indian side of the Himalayas. So forward positioning of supplies is done either via helicopters or by mule trains.

Small firearms make the difference between life and death at high altitude and in jungle warfare. So at times they are lugged from one location to other via helicopter or mule trains.

The Indian-built INSAS rifle had major breakdowns at subzero temperatures in Siachen, as it was not built to withstand those temperatures. The rifle performs well elsewhere and is used by the army in the plains. Soldiers on high-altitude duty are equipped with imported rifles that function better at those temperatures.

Ultra-light 155-mm artillery, which can be lifted by a helicopter, can make the difference in battle. Its mere presence at a location discourages the enemy. India’s procurement of 145 units from the United States on a very rapid government-to-government basis will change the battle dynamics in the mountains. These and other procurements provide the snow warriors with additional confidence.

This artillery is supplemented with the ultra-accurate Pinaka multi-barrel rocket system. This can be mobilized on trucks and moved to forward areas. Once released, it can devastate the enemy before it attacks.

The land version of India’s Brahmos missile, which can destroy command and control bunkers behind enemy lines, is also poised for deployment in the mountainous and high-altitude regions.

The most critical aspect of war in mountains and snow-clad peaks is the availability of troops close to the action. Mountain warfare sucks troops in never-ending numbers, which explains why India has 12 mountain divisions in readiness.

The Chinese have plenty of experience in mountain and jungle warfare too. The communists came to power in China after fighting 30 years as insurgents. Besides, dealing with Korea, Russia and India has given them additional experience.

China can put 20,000 soldiers anywhere at short notice on the India-Tibet border. They have a good road network and a variety of helicopters. Their snow-capable hardware is as good as the Indians’. The point is, when two equally capable armies meet, they size each other up and then they relent. China understands this point very well. If they cannot win a battle they will not fight. It happened with India at Sumdorong Chu, and they relented.

The Pakistanis are different; they are culturally suicidal. They knew well that the Kargil conflict could turn against them, but they still tried. Even today, they know that picking a fight with India is suicidal but they will keep on trying. Only recently have they adopted a defensive mood, as one of their key allies for asymmetrical warfare in the Northwest Frontier Province has turned against them.

India’s snow warfare capability has made astounding improvements. It was a major weakness earlier but has been permanently redressed now.

Peace is better preserved with strength; and it is this strength that is letting India concentrate on economic development more vigorously.

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(Hari Sud is a retired vice president of C-I-L Inc., a former investment strategies analyst and international relations manager. A graduate of Punjab University and the University of Missouri, he has lived in Canada for the past 34 years. ©Copyright Hari Sud.)