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But on Oct. 14, the home minister proposed talks with separatist groups in Kashmir without the condition of laying down their arms.
The Ministry of Home Affairs said in a press release that the government would follow a policy of “quiet diplomacy” to find a solution to the problem in Jammu and Kashmir. This was announced at the All India Editors’ Conference on social and infrastructure issues in Srinagar.
At the same forum, Home Minister P. Chidambaram said, “We have made it clear that insurgent groups in the northeast have to give up their demand for secessionism and lay down their arms and then only will we talk to them.” But when asked if this precondition also applied to terrorist groups in Kashmir, he replied in the negative.
According to Chidambaram, Kashmir has a “unique geography and history” and needs a “unique solution.” He admitted though that the central government has to contend with different thoughts and demands in the Kashmir valley.
What could be the reasoning behind this mellowed-down rhetoric? Is it some “external influence” that has dented the hubris of the Indian state? Or should this be seen as a kind of tactical measure to bring serenity in the valley? This could also be a sign of fatigue after two decades of combating armed insurgency in Kashmir.
In any case, it sends the wrong signal down the political lanes and alleys of the country. A mollified approach toward cross-border terrorism in Kashmir, which menacingly spills over to the rest of the country, is not a pragmatic strategic option for policymakers.
In another apparent act of conciliation, Home Secretary G. K. Pillai, on a two-day visit to the Indian state of Nagaland, went to the extent of saying that the Indian Constitution could be amended as part of a “political package” to be offered to the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah), which has waged an insurgency against the government since the early 1980s, though a ceasefire was agreed upon in 2001.
Pillai did not elaborate, however, on the “changes” to be incorporated in the Constitution. Presently, Article 371 A of the Indian Constitution grants special provisions to Nagaland. Perhaps there would be some changes in this article. Pillai also admitted that the Naga rebels secure ammunition from China, which evoked expected consternation. At the same time he swaggeringly said, “We don’t have to worry about China. We will handle China.”
It can be assumed that Pillai and Chidambaram would have coordinated their policies, and that one could not assert a position without the cognizance of the other.
Does this mean that the Indian authorities are embarking on a deliberate dual policy with respect to insurgency? India has historically followed the theory of liberalism while dealing with foreign policy and sternly pursued the premises of realism when domestic problems cropped up. The “Gill Doctrine” executed in the Punjab is a paradigm. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, as director general of police in Punjab, is credited with having brought the Punjab insurgency under control in the early 1990s.
But if realism is to be practiced it should be done consistently. One cannot have different rules of engagement for different terrorist groups. If the radical Red Taliban or the Nagas or the Mizos are to be outlawed, banned or incarcerated, then similar methods should be implemented for the Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad and others.
If the Kashmiri people are politically, culturally and synergistically tied to India proper, then it is an undeniable fact that India’s ever-neglected northeast is a part of the Indian whole, its Mongoloid traits and Burmese legacy notwithstanding, not to mention the tribal hues. After all, India has been more a cultural entity fostering pluralism than a political nation-state encouraging centrism.
Interestingly, Pillai categorically stated that the “political package” would be offered only to the NSCN (I-M) and ruled out talks with any other Naga outfit in the immediate future. This indicates that the government has zeroed in on its target group and is presently considering the NSCN as the sole representative of the Naga people.
But if secession is not to be granted, then what sort of political package will be proffered to the NSCN (I-M)? The ongoing ethnic conflict between the Nagas and the Kukis, fought since 1993, is an additional impediment to a solution in this region.
It might be that the government is following a carrot-and-stick policy to its fullest. The Red Taliban and other insurgent groups in the northeast or other parts of the country have not been tested to the hilt and hence cannot be offered a political package. So they will continue bearing the brunt of the “stick,” whereas Kashmiri separatists and the NSCN (I-M) will have the “carrot,” at least for the time being.
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(Uddipan Mukherjee has a doctorate in physics from the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research in Mumbai, India. He has qualified the Indian Civil Services Examination in 2007. He writes on international relations and security issues pertaining to India. He blogs at: http://uddipanmukherjee.blogspot.com. ©Copyright Uddipan Mukherjee.)
