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Also, from 1959 to 1990, China remained at loggerheads with the former Soviet Union, coming close to a nuclear war in 1969 over border issues. In between, it picked enmity with India and Vietnam.
Chinese rapprochement with the United States in 1971 was based on encircling the Soviets. But in the last ten years the strategic map of the world has changed. China is no longer at loggerheads with either the United States or the Russians. It is searching for a new enemy.
Unfortunately, India appears to be on the radar, and China has begun making passes at it. The two fought a brief border war in 1962, but that animosity appeared to dwindle to the point that former reformist leader Deng Xiaoping was prepared to shake hands with India. Still, he wanted no role for India in world affairs. This remained true until 1998, when India tested its nuclear bomb. Since then China has viewed India with suspicion.
Between 2001 and 2002, India settled all Cold War-related outstanding issues with the United States and began surging ahead economically. China found this hard to accept.
By 2006, India’s economy was growing at 9 percent and its domestic economy seemed to be doing better than China’s. The Chinese economy appeared larger, but because it exported 50 percent of its gross domestic product, little was left for internal consumption except that it had a spanking clean look due to foreign direct investment.
China’s exports created plenty of cash, but this was deposited in banks in the West, which the Chinese cannot use. Its spanking new look is only on the eastern seaboard, while the rest of the 870 million people live a more rustic life. Chinese statistics are deceptive. At US$2,000 per capita GDP, it still remains a developing nation.
Today, Russia is no longer China’s mortal enemy. It became economically weak after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Suddenly, the Chinese found themselves with a 3 million-strong military and no enemy in sight. Now it is looking to create one, preferably in its neighborhood – and India fits the bill.
India’s economy is smaller than China’s but it has more intellectual capability. It exports fewer material goods but is a major power in information technology, business process outsourcing and knowledge process outsourcing industries. China believes it can intimidate India, as its armed forces are less than half China’s.
There is a caveat to the above thought process, however. Geographically, India lies in the path of China’s vital oil supplies. So India could act at sea if China were to act in the Himalayas. This has lead China to conclude that India has to be dominated both in the Himalayas and at sea.
A dormant border dispute, which had not flared up in 50 years, has been re-ignited since the Chinese began a huge military buildup in Tibet, seen as the jumping ground for an invasion of India. If needed, China’s all-weather friend Pakistan could lend a hand.
If China is to repeat its 1962 war performance against India, a huge military buildup in Tibet and in the Indian Ocean is required, which it is undertaking now. But there are more negatives to the Chinese scenario than positives.
India is not what it was in 1962, as its military and navy are 10 times more capable now. Moreover, the United States is not keen on supporting any Chinese military adventurism. It views China’s military buildup in the last ten years with concern.
Aware of a possible swift Chinese action, India is building its own nuclear-capable missiles, submarines and military. Although China’s infrastructure gives it an edge in Tibet, Indian military hardware is technically superior compared to reverse-engineered Chinese military hardware built around stolen technology.
The Chinese will have to face major mountain ranges if they cross into India. These mountain ranges run for 150 miles and are as high as 19,000 to 24,000 feet, with deep valleys in between. Clearly this is to China’s disadvantage, as the terrain is not flat like the Tibetan plateau.
These mountains are impassable except for passes like Sela and Bomdila, at 14,000 feet and 8,000 feet, in India’s northeast Arunachal Pradesh state. The mountains are also India’s major supply problem. India can lure the Chinese into a trap and destroy them if it controls the high ground.
Still the Chinese are confident that they can bypass the Indians at Sela like they did in 1962. This is impossible now, say India’s military experts. The Tibet-Bhutan-Arunachal junction that was the Chinese route for the 1962 invasion of India is now closely monitored. Modern technologies permit India to observe Chinese movements day and night.
A border incident that occurred 20 years ago in this area speaks of high Indian preparedness. A haughty Chinese general ordered a border incursion in 1986 near the Bhutan-India-China junction. The Chinese intruded in large numbers in the strategic Sumdorong Chu river area, as it connects by a pathway to Tawang, the border Indian town that China claims as its own.
When diplomacy failed, India airlifted a full mountain brigade in battle-ready condition to the area in the middle of winter. China quickly relented and withdrew. The matter continued to simmer for a while, and although China rushed in 20,000 troops, its surprise and initiative were gone. In short, India demonstrated its willingness to fight should China insist.
Surprisingly, China is in a better position in Ladakh’s Aksai Chin plateau, which they have occupied since 1955. India’s supply line to Aksai Chin passes through a long and cumbersome route via the troubled Kashmir region. It is an 800-mile mountainous journey.
An alternate link is being built via the Rohtang Pass in India’s Himachal Pradesh state, but it only cuts 400 miles off the treacherous mountain journey. The other option is to supply troops by air; four advanced landing strips have been activated in the area.
There is one weakness on the Chinese side. The Aksai Chin plateau road network connects Tibet to China’s Xinjiang province. This road infrastructure is an asset to Chinese troops in Tibet, as they can resupply from Xinjiang. But the long-ignored Uighurs in Xinjiang are now up in arms with the Chinese authorities, putting the supply route at risk. Even minor support to their cause from India could cut China’s lifeline and advantage. But until that happens, India has to defend its lofty mountainous heights.
In search of an enemy, China may have found the wrong one in India. China’s stellar performance in the 1962 war against India cannot be repeated today. It also risks losing its oil supply line via the Indian Ocean, which would play havoc with its economy.
China should work on its policy toward India before it makes a blunder. It would be a better proposition for China to call off the military propaganda it has unleashed and revert back to normalcy. Forging strong trade ties would lead to greater progress and benefit to both sides.
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(Hari Sud is a retired vice president of C-I-L Inc., a former investment strategies analyst and international relations manager. A graduate of Punjab University and the University of Missouri, he has lived in Canada for the past 34 years. ©Copyright Hari Sud.)
