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These moves have raised international concerns, particularly in South Korea, Japan and the United States. They have angered China and the United Nations, which has been powerless to restrain North Korea.
Critics are describing the six-party talks as “futile” and previous engagement policies with North Korea as “failed.” They have expressed doubts that China will be able to maintain its leverage over North Korea. Many are questioning whether North Korea will eventually listen to China and return to the six-party talks.
At the same time, South Korea’s proactive policy to engage North Korea – from 1998 to 2008, under former presidents Kim Dae-jung and the late Roh Moo-hyun – has been blamed for allowing the North to develop its nuclear arsenal. Some analysts say the present situation is a by-product of soft policy toward the North.
The U.N. Security Council has condemned North Korea's nuclear test as a "clear violation" of existing council resolutions. Talks are still under way to decide whether sanctions will follow to punish North Korea. Some analysts are suggesting an even more aggressive policy of total disengagement from North Korea.
At present, anti-North Korea sentiment seems to be overriding any proposals to engage North Korea. The question is, will an aggressive approach yield the desired results? The current aims of the international community are to freeze North Korea’s nuclear programs and prevent it from passing on its nuclear technology to other countries such as Iran, Syria or even Sudan.
Therefore at this crucial time cool heads are needed to adopt a rational and effective policy toward North Korea that can return the deteriorating situation to a normal track.
Clearly, the six-party talks need to be strengthened so that agreements can actually be put into practice. A number of agreements have been signed and, at least temporarily, progress was being made through the talks. At least North Korea was willing to sit at the negotiation table. It even exploded its nuclear reactor tower in January 2007, and provided at least a partial list of its nuclear programs in 2008.
The North Korean regime lacks an efficient process for making decisions and following through by implementing policies. Its critics say it only cares about what it can get through negotiations, and conveniently ignores what it should give. Thus it is continuously playing a game of “chicken” with its opponents, making threats whenever it doesn’t get what it wants.
On the other hand, a consistent policy toward North Korea has also been lacking. When former U.S. President Jimmy Carter visited North Korea in 1994, U.S.-North Korean relations warmed up to the extent that the Bill Clinton administration signed the 1994 Agreed Framework. Unfortunately, for many reasons including a lack of financial support from the U.S. Congress, the agreement did not proceed as expected, and Clinton’s time ran out when George W. Bush won the 2000 election.
The Bush administration did not continue the engagement policy. In fact, Bush went so far as to include North Korea on his “axis of evil,” along with Iraq and Iran. North Korea has thus concluded that the United States holds a “hostile policy” toward it.
South Korea has also been inconsistent in its policies toward the North. Under the two previous administrations, the South provided economic aid, promoted railway links and set up joint economic ventures. Former South Korean presidents Kim and Roh visited North Korea. But when President Lee Myung-bak came to power, his administration abruptly backed away from his predecessors’ policies and adopted a more aggressive stance toward the North. It seems the hawks now override the doves within the government.
As for North Korea, it is well known that there is no mechanism to supervise its leader. This makes it especially difficult to influence or negotiate with the country.
North Korea has been rather consistent in its positions, however. It has claimed that its aggressive polices are rooted in its security concerns, its fear of invasion and of efforts to overthrow its regime. If North Korea fears it is the target of a conspiracy, it will not leave itself unprotected. This is its rationale for developing nuclear weapons.
Ultimately, ending North Korea’s nuclear programs will require a change in the North Korean mindset. Its fears must be addressed and its security assured if it is expected to lay down its arms. This change can only be brought about gradually, through a series of confidence-building steps. Therefore, a consistent and patient policy is needed.
First of all, some kind of U.N. sanctions may be required to send a message that its nuclear and missile tests are not acceptable to the international community. This approach alone is not likely to succeed, however. In fact, North Korea announced it would conduct its nuclear test in response to U.N. condemnation of its earlier launch of what it said was a satellite, but what the United States, Japan and other countries believed to be a missile.
Therefore, engagement is also necessary. North Korea must be convinced that its security is guaranteed, that the international community will neither attack it nor attempt to change its regime. It must also be convinced that its aggressive acts in themselves weaken its security. Further pursuit of nuclear weapons could cause its neighbors, South Korea and Japan, to pursue their own nuclear deterrent in response to the threat from North Korea.
The best forum for handling this issue remains the six-party talks, if North Korea can be convinced to return to them. If the five parties can agree on a comprehensive strategy to engage North Korea and to reward it in a timely way for taking steps to disarm, there is still hope to resolve this thorny issue.
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(Dr. Zhang Quanyi is associate professor at Zhejiang Wanli University in Ningbo, China, and a guest researcher at the Center for the Study of Non-traditional Security and Peaceful Development at Zhejiang University in Hangzhou. His research interest revolves around the creation of a world state. He can be contacted at qyzhangupi@gmail.com. ©Copyright Zhang Quanyi)
