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In the 1980s and 90s there were many incidents in which civilians were brutally hacked to death in direct face-to-face encounters. But then, as now, the larger number of victims would be those caught up in the more impersonal but equally death-dealing conventional warfare where not only the armed combatants are the casualties of artillery firing and air bombing.
It is likely that more attacks of the kind that took place on the passenger bus in Buttala that left some 30 dead will take place in the days and weeks ahead in different parts of the country, including Colombo. The LTTE's strategy to resist the Sri Lankan military's pincer attack from multiple directions into the northern territory they control in the Wanni can be expected to be two-fold. They will seek to resist the advancing units of the Sri Lankan military forces in conventional battle in order to hold onto the territory that is currently under their control, and which has given them the trappings of a separate state.
The LTTE's strategy outside the Wanni will be likely to take the form of guerilla and terror attacks that would create political and economic problems for the government. Five of the main countries that provide tourists to Sri Lanka issued travel advisories after the escalation of violence in the past three weeks. A fall in tourism would deal another blow to the declining economy.
In addition, the erosion of political support to the government due to its inability to protect the general population from the ravages of war can compromise its war effort. There will be political pressures on the government to pull in troops from the battle front to protect civilians elsewhere.
In these circumstances, the government will need to show continuous progress on the military battlefront if it is to contain the negative fallout of the costs of war. It is the promise and hope of victory in the not-so-distant future that keeps the general population behind the government. The government will face the challenge of burning its candle at both ends.
If it is to defend its constituencies in the rest of the country from LTTE attacks the government will have to reduce its offensive capacity in the northern theater of operations. On the other hand, the escalating cost of war, both human and economic, will impel the government to try and accelerate its military campaign and ensure rapid victories before the candle blows out.
In aiming to destroy the LTTE's military capacity on the battlefield, the government is seeking to achieve a rare feat in the annals of modern warfare. The political hardness of heart to bear any cost, as well as military superiority and international support stemming from the global war against terrorism are factors in the government's favor. Although few and far between, there have also been military successes in wars against ethnic separatists. Two recent examples come from the Indian suppression of Sikh separatism in Punjab and Russian suppression of separatism in Chechnya. But both these victories were secured by countries with enormous armies and virtually unlimited resources for the task at their disposal.
It is not surprising therefore that most countries that have been assisting Sri Lanka's development over the past decades have cautioned the government against single-minded over-reliance on the military option. While none of them have expressed any sympathy for the LTTE on account of its undemocratic nature and terrorist attacks, they have all urged the government to propose a political solution to the ethnic conflict. However, the government finds itself in a dilemma in this regard as any movement toward a solution will require a radical measure of power sharing with the Tamil people of the north and east.
The government's difficulties with regard to a political solution come from two main sources. The first is President Mahinda Rajapaksa's promise to the people in his election manifesto of November 2005 that saw him win the presidency. The president promised to uphold the unitary system of governance that, in the perception of the Sinhalese majority, is the best guarantee of the country's unity. The success of the president as a politician has been his ability to identify himself with the fears and aspirations of the ethnic majority, and to apparently share them himself.
The second source of the government's difficulties comes from the extreme nationalist People's Liberation Front, or JVP, which enjoys disproportionate power in the current Parliament. The JVP has laid down a condition that no political solution, and not even the existing 13th Amendment to the Constitution, should be implemented until the LTTE is militarily defeated and disarmed.
This type of uncompromising position is unlikely to be held by the majority of people. But the JVP's advantageous position in Parliament, where it is able to provide the government with its majority, enables them to impose their diktat on the government to which it is providing ideological leadership.
In these circumstances, much attention is being devoted to the outcome of the All Parties Representatives Committee appointed by the president over a year and a half ago to find a political solution to the ethnic conflict. It is important for national unity that the hope of a just political solution to the ethnic conflict should remain alive, especially to the Tamil people. The APRC has set itself a deadline of Jan. 23 to come out with a final proposal.
A draft proposal put out by the APRC a little over a year ago was widely hailed as a viable proposition that could provide a basis for a political solution. While it would not go so far as to explicitly propose a federal solution, the proposal indicated that the political solution had to go beyond the confines of the present unitary constitutional framework.
This has been a longstanding demand of the ethnic minorities who seek a power-sharing solution to the ethnic conflict. But unfortunately for them and for the country at large a return to the negotiating table where such a political proposal can be the subject of give and take is not on the cards, and will most likely have to await the outcome of war.
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(Dr. Jehan Perera is executive director of the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, an independent advocacy organization. He studied economics at Harvard College and holds a doctorate in law from Harvard Law School. ©Copyright Jehan Perera.)
