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For the past two years the government and the LTTE have been engaging in a high level of hostilities tantamount to war, including the overrunning of forward defense lines, capture of territory, artillery, sea and air bombing, and large-scale displacement of people and violations of human rights.
From the inception of the Ceasefire Agreement in February 2002 the agreement had many opponents, in particular the People's Liberation Front, or JVP, who took the message that the Ceasefire Agreement endangered the unity of the country. In particular the notion of lines of control with large chunks of Sri Lankan territory accepted to be under the LTTE, and the acceptance of two armies, were denounced. Another set of arguments was the LTTE's own violations of the Ceasefire Agreement, which were highlighted in the media and by the government. Thus the case for continuing with it became weak in the eyes of most people.
These are some of the factors that account for the widespread acceptance of the abrogation of the Ceasefire Agreement within the polity. So far the opposition to the abrogation has been muted and virtually drowned out by the acclamations. If the masses of people felt that the continuation of the Ceasefire Agreement, even as an empty shell, gave some sort of guarantee against an all-out escalation of violence, this sentiment was not immediately apparent in either the media or the streets. Even at the time of the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement there were no mass demonstrations in support of it. Now with its demise there has been no mass action to mourn it.
The international reactions to the abrogation of the Ceasefire Agreement, however, have not been muted. While the international response has so far been limited to statements, they have been strong. All of the international statements have expressed disappointment and regret, and highlighted the unfeasibility of the military option that the government appears to be relying on. So far the key international actors to have issued statements include the United Nations, the United States, Canada, the Scandinavian countries, Japan, India, Australia and France.
At the least, the expectation of these key international actors appears to be that the government needs to take decisive steps to re-activate the political process that could lead to a political solution. Perhaps with a view to mitigate an international backlash against it, the government itself has been taking pains to affirm that a political solution will soon be on offer. While such a positive step will be welcome, it is likely to be politically unfeasible. The JVP has already stated that if the government proposes a federal solution, which is the minimum that could satisfy Tamil aspirations, let alone the LTTE, the JVP will work to unseat the government.
The irony of the present political situation is that the government, although it appears to be strong and determined at the level of its leadership, is in reality a structurally weak one. The ability of the government to steer the diverse array of groups and interests that comprise the government coalition in the direction of a political solution is doubtful. The ethnic conflict has defied a political solution for over six decades, spanning the entirety of the country's independence.
It seems to be too much to expect a government that is so fragmented as the present one, and which does not enjoy a clear majority in Parliament, to accomplish what more unified governments failed to do. In these circumstances, the easier course for the government to follow would be to accelerate the war against the LTTE and use the war and patriotism to unify the ethnic majority while silencing the opposition, at least for a while.
The abrogation of the Ceasefire Agreement may therefore have a rationale that goes beyond the obvious one of catering to the JVP's agenda in order to retain its parliamentary support. One of the features of the present war that has earned international opprobrium has been the high level of human rights violations. In this context the abrogation of the Ceasefire Agreement will also make the prosecution of the war easier, because it will eliminate the presence of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission set up under the agreement to query the conflicting parties about their non-compliance with its provisions and which had a mandate to report on violations of the agreement.
Although the international monitors were never able to actually put a stop to the acts of violence, their presence on the ground is likely to have had some sort of deterrent effect, as their reports were widely read by the international community. The dismantling of their monitoring apparatus can set the stage for an escalation of violence with an even greater level of impunity than at present. This would have catastrophic consequences to the people caught up in the conflict zones in particular, as both the government and LTTE have been effective in keeping out both media and other nonpartisan monitors from those areas.
In refashioning the conditions on the ground and also in the propaganda and psychological war, the ground is being set for a fight to the finish. A considerable amount of optimism has been generated that the LTTE can be effectively defeated in the course of the year. The main challenge that the government faces in the short term is the reaction of the international community. The statements by Sri Lanka's main donors, including Japan, indicating concern about abrogation of the Ceasefire Agreement could change into action in the event of escalated war sans political reform.
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(Dr. Jehan Perera is executive director of the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, an independent advocacy organization. He studied economics at Harvard College and holds a doctorate in law from Harvard Law School. ©Copyright Jehan Perera.)
