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If any of its critical components, such as U-235 or plutonium, falls into al-Qaida's hands, the West will face the risk of suffering through a nuclear holocaust. Nations in the vicinity will also have to watch out for nuclear threats.
Nuclear weapons in Pakistan today are stored in multiple components. These locations, eight to ten in all, are in the vicinity of large military bases, Sargoda being the principal storage site. At a time of crisis these components would be mated together to create a working bomb. This, together with a delivery system, would be brought out only a short time before its ultimate use. Missiles and planes are kept in readiness to receive the bomb.
Former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell complained a few years back that the United States does not know the exact location of all the nuclear components. This means that U.S. secret services, although hand-in-glove with their Pakistani counterparts since the 1980s, have not fully penetrated the Pakistani nuclear security system. They do not fully understand the complexity of all the safeguards, although the United States helped to train personnel and supplied hardware to secure the nuclear materials.
Indian intelligence services have not fared any better. Still, Indian knowledge of Pakistan's nuclear establishment is much better than U.S. and other Western intelligence agencies. But any cooperation between Indian and Western intelligence agencies would cause the Pakistanis to break off contact. That would ruin any chance of the West ever gaining insight into Pakistan's nuclear weapons and their whereabouts.
How easy would it be for al-Qaida to steal any of the nuclear components?
Not very easy, unless a political crisis were to develop and result in the army splitting along ethnic, religious and political lines. In a pinch, any one of the base commanders could open doors of storage sites to al-Qaida.
This possibility always existed, but chances of its happening now have multiplied exponentially. The fighting that the Pakistani army is engaged in these days on the Pakistani-Afghan border has witnessed the start of the ethnic divide in the army.
The Pakistani army has a 15-percent Pashtun component. Some of these troops were sent to the tribal areas to put down a rebellion inspired by al-Qaida and the Taliban in the last year. Surprisingly, a large contingent of government troops, mostly ethnic Pashtuns, surrendered by the hundreds to the ill-equipped al-Qaida and Taliban fighters. The Pashtuns did not wish to fight their brethren in the tribal areas.
Similarly the Baloch component of the Pakistani army, which is 9 percent of the total force, is also not eager to fight. They believe that their province and its civilian leadership have been shabbily treated by the army high command, which is mostly Punjabi and Mohajir. With this divide, it is easier for terrorists to penetrate the nuclear storage sites.
Today, al-Qaida wants a pound or two of either highly enriched uranium or plutonium. These components, if smuggled into the West, could set off a crude radioactive bomb that would contaminate a large city for hundreds of years. The political and economic impact of this catastrophe would be untold. One or two such explosions would force the rest of the world to its knees. The time to prevent this from happening is now!
Hence, it is important that the United States keeps all the nuclear components in Pakistan within its gun sights. Otherwise this world, its economy and political systems as we now know them, could cease to exist.
How can this be achieved?
Pakistan itself is incapable of undertaking the necessary stringent safeguards, given the ethnic and religious divisions in society. It does not matter whether this general is in power or democrats of the likes of Benazir Bhutto are in power. The latter is untrustworthy as she was responsible earlier for trading nuclear technology for missiles with North Korea. Also the Taliban was created on her orders. Expecting her to be strict with her own brainchild is a bit difficult to comprehend.
Also, the role of China cannot be ignored in this context. China supplied the design of the first Pakistani nuclear bomb, trading it for the F-16 fighter in the Pakistani inventory. China will have to be brought on board and made to realize that the dangers of these technologies in al-Qaida hands are not only to the West, India or Israel but also to China. Hence they should cooperate.
The United States is missing the point if it continues business as usual after the present crisis is over. The political situation in Pakistan is unlikely to change within a generation or two. Pakistan's nuclear weapons will remain a serious liability, no matter who is in power.
There is a significant religious-minded base in Pakistan, created over the last 20 years, which will keep on creating challenges unknown before. Therefore the United States' Pakistan-friendly policy should be balanced against knowledge of, and safeguards for, the nuclear weapons components. Pakistan's failure to follow on this should automatically lead to a cutoff of aid and other economic restrictions.
What has the United States proposed in the last few years to safeguard Pakistan's nuclear weapons?
In 2005, the United States was helping to install permissive action links, or PALs, on Pakistani weapons. This sophisticated box with an electronic cryptographic code disarms the nuclear weapon by disarming or disabling the nuclear trigger if unauthorized entry is made. U.S. engineers were not allowed to actually undertake this project, but Pakistani personnel were trained by the United States to undertake it.
After the installation, the United States felt a bit safer -- at least until General Pervez Musharraf created the present crisis. Now his hold on power is a bit shaky. The great ethnic divide which has occurred and the resurgence of al-Qaida and the Taliban makes it harder to trust the nuclear weapons guardians in the Pakistani army.
An alternative would be to remove the nuclear materials from Pakistan, or at least to get a full accounting of all nuclear components and their storage locations. In case of an unauthorized break-in, the PAL system automatically shuts down the weapons. U.S. eyes on the ground could quickly pinpoint the break-in and react with B-2s or a commando force.
It is unlikely that a break-in would occur without the concurrence of the army units guarding the facilities. Hence a commando force would have to be ready to react at short notice to neutralize the offending army guardians.
Pakistan -- whether it is Benazir Bhutto or Musharraf or another army man in power -- has to realize that its nuclear weapons are at risk. It was much easier to build them. It is twice as hard to keep them safe.
Even if the bulk of the Pakistani population opted for democracy -- or in a worst-case scenario, if martial law were declared -- the rogue elements now established in the border regions would be eyeing the nuclear weapons. They could bribe or religiously indoctrinate anybody to make them part with the secrets. Once any critical components are in terrorist hands, the results will be most unpleasant.
The United States can exert pressure today through the continuation or withdrawal of military and economic aid. Both forms of aid are urgently needed. Both are tools in the U.S. arsenal to persuade Pakistan to do the right thing. A delay in the U.S. supplying spare parts for F-16s and other military hardware would cut into Pakistan's defense strategy.
China, if persuaded to back the Western effort, would not be able to fill the void. Hence Pakistan would be forced to follow the U.S. lead. Any disagreement on the part of the generals would be met with the cutoff of U.S. aid.
There is very little time left to persuade Pakistan to let the West know where its nuclear weapons components are stored. These must be safeguarded from the terrorists. Pakistan should be made to understand that in return, aid will continue and additional help will be provided to rid Pakistan of the rogue elements.
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(Hari Sud is a retired vice president of C-I-L Inc., a former investment strategies analyst and international relations manager. A graduate of Punjab University and the University of Missouri, he has lived in Canada for the past 34 years. ©Copyright Hari Sud.)
