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On that occasion the government had reason to be concerned about the fate of around 15,000 people whose livelihoods were affected by the LTTE blockade. In the case of Silavathurai the government's stated rationale is the need to rescue about 6,000 people from LTTE rule and thereby liberate them. The LTTE's behavior gives a measure of credibility to the government's justification for expanding the theater of war.
Reports emanating from the LTTE-controlled areas of the north, and corroborated by international human rights organizations, speak of forced conscription by the militant group. All families are required to provide one family member.
Not even the traditional deference paid by Tamil society to education is holding the group back at this time. High school children are being denied the right to pursue their university studies, but instead have to join the LTTE if the family has no one else to send. Human rights violations of this nature that keep the LTTE on the banned list of international terrorist organizations are useful to the government when it seeks to justify its military operations.
Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa has stated that the government will continue to prosecute the war against the LTTE in the north in the same manner it did with success in the east, through a low-intensity campaign. There are several advantages that accrue to the government by following a strategy of low-intensity warfare.
The first is that it minimizes the loss of military personnel, unlike large-scale offensives that have seen the number of casualties rise to several hundred in a single day's fighting. Such heavy losses on the military battlefield can hasten discontent in the Rajapaksa government's rural strongholds, from which the bulk of the military and its electoral support is drawn. On the other hand a low-intensity war with few casualties, like that carried out in the eastern campaign, could continue to sustain support for the government in the rural areas.
A second advantage to the government is that a low-intensity war promises to be longer rather than shorter in duration. Being embroiled in a patriotic war can be a life support system to a government unable to deliver economic benefits to the people due to corruption and inefficiency. An electorate wishing to throw out a government for failing so badly to resolve its economic problems could be induced to be more patient in the context of war. The prevalence of war and the possibility of terrorist attacks also give more legitimacy to the government's strong-arm tactics intended to suppress democratic freedoms for the sake of security.
This analysis suggests that, at least in the current context, the government will not wish to escalate the current military offensives in the north to any significant degree. The military offensives are likely to be restricted to specific areas of the north, such as Silavathurai, and not widen or intensify into full-scale war. The government has learned from the past that large-scale military offensives are politically difficult to sustain due to the high cost factor, both in terms of military casualties and economic costs. This may explain the government's oft-repeated position that the current phase of war is likely to continue for two to three years.
On the other hand, the war strategy of the government has taken its greatest toll on the very people whom the government claims to wish to liberate and rescue from the LTTE. The aftermath of the eastern military operations shows that the eviction of the militants has not brought normalcy back to the lives of the people of the east.
During the government's military offensives, large numbers of them had to flee their homes and end up in refugee camps for displaced persons. Tens of thousands have yet to be resettled, and tens of thousands find that their homes are either destroyed or damaged beyond their capacity to repair. In addition, with the threat of LTTE infiltration back into those areas still high, the east continues to be highly militarized and life is insecure for the people.
Unfortunately the current military operations in the north, aimed at rescuing the people from the LTTE, are unlikely to yield anything more positive than they have in the east. The likely scenario is the displacement of thousands of people from their homes, the destruction of many homes, and limited government efforts at reconstruction.
The Silavathurai campaign in the north has already displaced over 4,000 people. In addition, keeping the newly recaptured territories secure from LTTE infiltration will pose enormous logistical difficulties, and will require a heavy military presence that will continue to make life insecure for the people.
But tragically, so long as the majority of people accept the logic that the LTTE has no genuine interest in a negotiated peace settlement within the framework of one country, those who can show military success against it will be at an advantage over those who advocate anything different.
The only way this logic can be changed is for the LTTE to demonstrate that they are serious about negotiating a peaceful settlement that will ensure the rights of the Tamil people within a united Sri Lanka. Phrases such as being prepared to consider a "viable alternative" to Tamil Eelam and being prepared to "explore" a federal solution to the ethnic conflict have to give way to more concrete solutions that the LTTE shows they are amenable to.
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(Dr. Jehan Perera is executive director of the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, an independent advocacy organization. He studied economics at Harvard College and holds a doctorate in law from Harvard Law School. ©Copyright Jehan Perera.)
