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Under the leadership of army strongman Zia Ul Haq, from 1978 to 1988, internal politics had moved from the secular to the religious. General Zia had received a huge economic aid package for helping the United States defeat the Soviets. Top of the list was the most sophisticated military hardware the United States was willing to give to a non-NATO member.
With this in hand, Zia wished to threaten India. Alas, he did not live to see that day. He died in a plane crash in 1988, and a sweet-talking but very clever Bhutto became Pakistan's prime minister. She began where Zia had left off. The dreaded ISI grabbed the chance and began the Kashmir insurgency.
The Pakistani secret service is a cross between religious fanatics and like-minded military men. Mullahs provide the fanatic recruits, Middle Eastern and local sources provide the funds and ISI organizes them and trains them. Earlier, the ISI had worked with Osama Bin Laden and Taliban organizations. Between them they had created a tough-minded worldwide jihadi movement.
All this was known to U.S. and Indian secret services, but U.S. agents thought they could bribe their way into the military leadership in Pakistan and continue to use the jihadis to their advantage. It did not happen.
Bhutto made her first mistake when she authorized the ISI to create the Taliban movement. She made her second mistake in allowing the ISI to begin the Kashmir insurgency and other terrorist activities in India. A perfect arrangement was made in which the ISI would initiate trouble and the political leadership would make diplomatic noises to justify terror. Bhutto was gone in 1996 after her second term, but her successor continued this arrangement.
These two nefarious deals damaged the rest of the world by creating jihadi movements, which are the sole cause of terrorism in the world. Ten years after the Taliban's birth, under its protection Osama Bin Laden pulled off the greatest terrorist act of 9/11.
In Indian Kashmir, Pakistani-trained terrorists began the ethnic cleansing of Hindus from Kashmir and instigated general mayhem. India replied in kind and rushed in its security forces. The United States took a dim view of this Indian move and favored Pakistan. That is where they went wrong.
Bhutto's successor wished to keep the army on his side, hence gave it a free hand to run the Taliban war in Afghanistan and terror activities in Kashmir. This resulted in the Kargil crisis of 1999, the attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001, and the complete capture of Afghanistan by the Taliban.
Overconfident Pakistani military leaders overestimated their strength and underestimated Indian determination in Kargil. Pakistan lost the war and got a fright when Indian forces threatened to invade Pakistan in 2001. The new military ruler General Pervez Musharraf relented quickly. He slowly withdrew military support to the terrorists. The terror movement in Kashmir did not die completely, but its teeth got knocked out.
Under pressure from the United States, Musharraf decided to cut the cord with the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden's organization officially after 9/11. Unofficially, he let the ISI support both organizations with retired military men and material. Also, he kept hiding Osama Bin Laden and his deputies in Pakistan.
The United States tolerated this, hoping their military victory over the Taliban would be permanent. It was not to be. The United States got busy in Iraq and handed over the policing of Afghanistan to half-hearted NATO. This was their biggest mistake. The Taliban and the ISI regrouped in Pakistan and mounted an even greater threat to the NATO forces, including the Canadians, who became their primary target.
As the Taliban attacks mounted in Afghanistan, it became clear that regrouping and training was taking place in Pakistan. Privately, the United States protested, and Musharraf responded by rushing a light contingent of troops to the area. They were not there to confront the Taliban but to pacify the locals. The Taliban and al Qaida continued to prosper.
The United States never fully understood that despite US$10 billion in aid, Pakistanis favored the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden. Musharraf was despised in Pakistan for allowing the United States to drive the Taliban and al Qaida out of Afghanistan. His support for U.S. policies began to unravel his understanding with the religious parties. This culminated in the recent Lal Masjid military operation in Islamabad -- an act which has become a rallying point for the anti-Musharraf and anti-U.S. movement in Pakistan.
One frequently asked question is: Why hasn't another army general overthrown Musharraf? The answer is simple. Musharraf has been successful in getting U.S. military hardware for free. In addition, Pakistani businessmen love the U.S. money that has propped up the Pakistani economy. This makes him popular enough to stay in power.
To make things worse for himself, however, Musharraf picked a nasty fight with the Supreme Court chief justice and attempted to remove him from office. He lost that fight and lost a bit of face.
The Lal Masjid military operation turned the jihadi elements, which are rampant in the Muslim madrassas, into suicide bombers to avenge the death of their fellow jihadis at Lal Masjid. Now it has become a law and order situation. The monster the Pakistani leadership created fifteen years back has come back to bite them.
Are Musharraf's days numbered? Not likely, as long as the military is happy with its new military hardware, and the United States continues to support him.
The balance sheet is such that, as long as Musharraf continues to fool the United States, he will stay in power. His continued denial that Osama Bin Laden and his number two man are hiding in Pakistan has not sat well with U.S. officials, who have independently confirmed their presence in Pakistan. Now the United States is getting edgy.
A few reports released by the U.S. government have directly pointed an accusing finger at Pakistan for sheltering and training the Taliban and al Qaida. In the last two weeks, Pakistan has been branded "terror central" for the world. There is no easy way out. The religious fanatics in the last fifteen years have gained a large political following. They are not going to give up easily.
The United States is breathing down Musharraf's neck to do a bit more -- otherwise the military hardware supply will stop, putting Pakistan's defenses in jeopardy vis-à-vis India. That action will not sit well with the Pakistani military. The jihadi organizations, which have gained ground lately, are not about to give up their quest for more power.
Musharraf's room to maneuver has become limited. The situation begs for new leadership. The return of Bhutto to power would not solve any of the country's problems. Pakistan needs someone like Kamal Attaturk, the Turkish reformer. Until a person like him emerges, able to deal strongly with the Mullahs, the rest of the world will have to endure sleepless nights.
