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The political spin and reciprocal recriminations following the conclusion of the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen resemble nothing so much as the Japanese murder mystery “Rashomon.” Every participant is putting forth a different account of what happened, who committed the crime and for what nefarious ends.

British Climate Secretary Ed Miliband accused China – now the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases – of trying to hijack the U.N. summit and "hold the world to ransom" to prevent a deal being reached.

A member of the Maldivian delegation – another Brit – stated even more bluntly: "China wrecked the talks, intentionally humiliated Barack Obama, and insisted on an awful ‘deal’ so Western leaders would walk away carrying the blame. How do I know this? Because I was in the room and saw it happen."

China did not suffer these accusations in silence, and issued its share of vitriolic language. During the conference, China's Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei said that he was "shocked" by U.S. climate envoy Todd Stern's comments that the United States was not in debt to the world for its historically high carbon emissions and that China should not expect any American climate aid money.

"I don't want to say the gentleman is ignorant," Minister He told reporters. "I think he lacks common sense or is extremely irresponsible."

It is not uncommon for international meetings to devolve into finger pointing, but normally the signs are evident well in advance, and political leaders stay far away. In Copenhagen, however, the leaders were there, flailing for all to see.

The president of the United States was stood up by the Chinese premier and had to gatecrash a BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) meeting in order to craft the eventual anodyne and non-binding Copenhagen Accord. The frantic post-conference scramble for high ground shows that whatever it was that happened at Copenhagen, it was not expected. At least not by the United States.

That is likely because to understand what really happened and why, it is necessary to take a step back and take a wider perspective – one that includes not only the climate accord, but also the global economic situation and geopolitics.

Although Copenhagen was billed as a "climate summit," the term was a misnomer from the start. There was always doubt about whether the conference would result in comprehensive, effective action on climate change. Very early on in the meeting the option of taking action to limit temperature rises to a global average increase of 1.5 degrees Celsius was rejected. In the end, the Copenhagen Accord only says "the increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius."

So what was the meeting about? From the perspective of the United States, European Union and other industrialized countries, the focus was largely on creating financial mechanisms around carbon trading, technology transfers, financing for "green tech," economic growth targets and verification regimes. It would have been more accurate to bill it a "climate market" conference.

There were sound financial reasons for this. With the right deal the global carbon market alone, worth an estimated US$118 billion in 2008, could potentially be worth more than US$2 trillion by 2020. This created strong incentives to ensure that the markets were based in established financial centers such as New York and London.

Negotiators from the United States, European Union and other industrialized countries had been working on this financial track for a long time, and likely believed going in to Copenhagen that the groundwork had been laid for such a deal. The assumption was likely that China, given enough incentives – especially around technology transfer – would sign on out of self-interest, and others such as India would give in to pressure to accede rather than risk isolation.

However, while the West was largely looking at Copenhagen as a climate market deal, others were taking a more multi-faceted view.

China, as it often does in international negotiations, was pursuing multiple agendas. It engaged in climate market negotiations to press for national advantage, but was also using the meeting to cement its role as a leadership voice in the developing world. This was to be expected.

The big surprise was India. After sending some mixed messages before the conference, New Delhi finally made it clear that as far as it was concerned the meeting was about long-term strategic options. It questioned the good faith of the Western negotiators, with at least one Indian strategist pointing out that some of the same people involved in credit default swaps that contributed to the collapse of the global financial system were involved in setting up carbon trading. In some quarters, the financial crisis has substantially undermined trust in Western-backed financial mechanisms.

India didn't like or trust the proposed deal and wanted to show the West that a compliant India could not be taken for granted. Just as important, it wanted to show that, should a perceived fair deal with the West not be possible, it had other options, namely a closer relationship with China.

This dovetailed with a broader strategic reevaluation of the India-China relationship.

China is aware that some think India should be used to counter it, and would like to increase cooperation, rather than competition, with its Himalayan neighbor so that it can focus on other arenas. And India is questioning if it should allow itself to be used as a pawn against China, taking a loss both economically and in terms of security, but seeing little benefit.

As a result, a fascinating and potentially game-changing geopolitical pas-de-deux unfolded in Copenhagen. The international media and punditocracy christened the United States and China the new G2, in reference to the expected preeminent leadership roles of the United States and China of their respective developed and developing country contingents. But what increasingly became clear was that a different G2 was influencing the agenda: China and India.

India demonstrated that, while it wants an equal alliance with the United States and its Western allies, a subservient allegiance is not an option.

This was clear in the way India approached a key Copenhagen sticking point – verification. India had been down this road before with the U.S.-India nuclear deal, where Washington's insistence on external verification was seen by some Indian strategists as undermining India's sovereignty and security and a potential excuse to impose costly sanctions.

India, which was also recently hit with restrictions on even the transit of its pharmaceuticals across Europe, is suspicious that the West will use climate as an excuse to put in place fresh trade barriers. New Delhi sees the proposed "binding verification" of emission cuts as a means for finding justifications for "green tariffs" and even for industrial espionage.

As a result, in Copenhagen external, binding emissions verification was a political non-starter for India. However, the United States continued to push for it, even after the conference ended. For example, according to senior White House Advisor David Axelrod's interpretation of the Copenhagen Accord, the United States would not only "review" the implementation of domestic actions by India and China but also "challenge" them if these goals were not met.

India's Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh firmly refuted Axelrod's depictions, declaring them "unacceptable" and reassuring the Indian Parliament that there would be no verification.

In the case of the restrictions placed on India via the U.S.-India nuclear deal, India viewed the conditions so detrimental to its security that it made a subsequent deal with Russia that ensured uranium fuel supply even if it tested a nuclear device. This showed that the United States was no longer in a position to unilaterally dictate terms and that by pushing potential allies too hard, it could push them right into competing camps.

This was essentially what happened at Copenhagen. Indian concerns about the deal gave an opportunity for China to entice India into an alliance with it, despite the vastly different mix of emissions of both countries. India then brought along its IBSA partners South Africa and Brazil. It was this expanded group that saw its conclave gatecrashed by President Obama in his search for solutions.

Two very important messages were delivered in Copenhagen. India said to the West that it could no longer be taken for granted – it had options. The other message was from China to India. China told India it would be open to a new relationship with India based on mutual interest.

Going in to Copenhagen, the “Rashomon” narratives of the conference varied more than many realized. The West primarily thought it was negotiating a trade deal – as evidenced by the drop in EU carbon trading prices after the talks failed to deliver a climate market deal. China was negotiating for a trade deal, but kept options open for larger strategic advantages. And India wanted to drive home big geopolitical points.

Coming out of Copenhagen, the narrative is clearer: This was geopolitics pure and simple.

India, as the world's most populous democracy, with a thriving economy and one of the world's largest English-speaking populations, is a natural ally for the United States. However India is wary after its recent experience with nuclear cooperation with the United States. Such paranoia gave Beijing an opportunity to entice New Delhi into an alliance with it at Copenhagen, despite the two emerging powers' many conflicts, not least China's development of Pakistan as a nuclear client state and ongoing border disputes and skirmishes.

If the United States and its Western allies are to coax India – and by extension a substantial portion of the developing world – into going along with an ambitious emissions reduction program, or indeed any other trade regime, it will need to desist from seeking to impose measures that are seen by New Delhi as protectionist or too self-serving.

The gain of getting the world's most populous democracy on its side – not on China's – is worth some concessions, not just for the sake of a climate deal but for larger strategic purposes. The West made the mistake in Copenhagen of lumping India together with China, and this mistaken view proved to be self-fulfilling.

Analysis of India has long suffered from “hyphenation.” First it was India-Pakistan, now India-China. At the beginning the India-China link was competitive; Copenhagen has shown it has the potential to become cooperative. The time has come to rehyphenate democratic, economically strong, English-speaking India. It would be to the benefit of the United States and its allies to create a new cooperative link: India-United States.

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(Ms. Paskal is a fellow at Chatham House in London and author of the forthcoming book "Global Warring: How Environmental, Economic, and Political Crises Will Redraw the World Map" (Palgrave). Mr. Savitt, a former Beijing-based correspondent for United Press International, is the author of the forthcoming memoir "Crashing the Party" (Atlas). ©Copyright Cleo Paskal and Scott Savitt)