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But a breakthrough in the critical civil nuclear area eluded them, with the visiting Japanese prime minister expecting India to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-ban Treaty, and Singh indicating that India’s decision on the CTBT would follow ratification by the United States and China.

In a nutshell then, how did the first trip of the new Japanese prime minister to India go? The habitual naysayers will regard the visit as below average, highlighting Hatoyama’s cool response to India’s hope of securing civil nuclear technology from Japan. But such a view does not stand close scrutiny. Overall, the trip was a success.

As the only country that has faced nuclear attacks, it is understandable that Japan is sensitive on matters such as the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and the CTBT. But that does not detract from the fact that over the last few years India and Japan have agreed on more issues, disagreeing on only a few.

In fact, the most important aspect of Hatoyama’s three-day visit to India from Dec. 27 to 29 was that it took place. Unlike the Liberal Democratic Party that long ruled Japan and had a clear policy of strengthening ties with India in the 21st century, Hatoyama’s Democratic Party of Japan, which stunned the world with its remarkable victory in parliamentary elections last August, has focused on China. In its election manifesto, India was not mentioned at all.

The DPJ and its Secretary-General Ichiro Ozawa have been extremely sensitive to China’s concerns and aspirations in Asia and the rest of the world. Ozawa flew 645 people, including 143 DPJ members of Parliament, to Beijing in five airplanes early this month. He also forced Japanese Emperor Akihito to grant an exceptional audience to Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping during his visit to Tokyo two weeks ago. These actions reveal the changed foreign policy priorities of Japan under the new regime.

Indian policymakers were naturally worried as to whether the Hatoyama regime would share the vision of the LDP, which had strongly advocated a greater role for India in the Asia-Pacific region and its proposed East Asian Community – something China has never appreciated.

Similarly, it was unclear whether Hatoyama would continue the recent practice of annual summit meetings between India and Japan. Since Prime Minister Manmohan Singh went to Tokyo last year, it was the turn of the Japanese prime minister to be in New Delhi before the year ended.

Hearteningly, Hatoyama dispelled Indian worries on both counts. He kept his appointment with India, and Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada has envisaged opening EAC membership to Japan, China, South Korea, ASEAN, Australia, New Zealand and India – the same countries that participated in the East Asia Summit in 2005.

What all this indicates is that factors promoting India and Japan as global partners are becoming more relevant with each passing day, thereby ensuring that the momentum is not lost with the change of regimes, whether in New Delhi or Tokyo. Some hard facts will make this point clear.

A recent Japanese survey revealed that India is the most favored destination for long-term Japanese investment. India is regarded by 70 percent of Japanese manufacturers as the most attractive country to do business, followed by China (67 percent), Russia (37 percent) and Vietnam (28 percent).

In 2008 Indo-Japan bilateral trade stood at over US$13 billion and was in favor of Japan with US$2.6 billion. This figure is expected to cross the $20 billion mark by the end of 2010.

Japan has been India's largest bilateral donor for more than a decade. For the last four fiscal years India has also been the largest recipient of Japanese official development assistance, overtaking China. Japanese ODA has been and is being utilized mainly for infrastructure projects such as power plants, transportation, environmental projects and projects related to basic human needs. In fact, the summit between Singh and Hatoyama specifically focused on infrastructural developments, particularly the proposed dedicated rail freight corridor between New Delhi and Mumbai.

In February this year Japan’s Foreign Ministry conducted an opinion poll in India on the image of Japan. The results showed that most Indians have a positive image of Japan, with 76 percent of respondents saying they perceived the current state of Japan-India relations either as being very friendly or friendly.

Asked which countries are important partners for India, 48 percent, 30 percent and 14 percent of respondents chose the United States, Russia and Japan, respectively; 92 percent of survey participants responded positively when asked whether Japan is a reliable friend of India.

Respondents perceived Japan as a technologically advanced, economically powerful and peace-loving country, in descending order of the number of responses. Also, 79 percent perceived Japan’s economic assistance to India as beneficial, and 94 percent welcomed the presence of Japanese companies in India.

But economic relations constitute only one component if India and Japan are to remain global partners. The other pillar of India-Japan relations has to be strategic convergences. There are compelling facts to support this.

India is the largest democracy in Asia and Japan the most prosperous. Both are functioning and vibrant democracies, with a social matrix that emphasizes harmony and consensus, rather than confrontation. Their economies are market oriented and largely complementary. Both share a common desire for peace and stability. Both believe that the United Nations should be strengthened and its decision-making apparatus made more representative. Both support a cooperative and comprehensive approach to combating international terrorism and sea piracy.

Therefore, it was fitting that Singh and Hatoyama signed an ambitious joint declaration titled a “New Stage of India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership,” with an action plan on security cooperation as its centerpiece.

The action plan to advance security cooperation, based on a declaration signed in October last year, included a newly established "2 plus 2" dialogue framework at the sub-Cabinet senior official level, involving the external affairs and defense ministries. The action plan includes an annual strategic dialogue at the foreign minister level, regular consultations between national security advisers, and regular meetings between defense ministers.

India and Japan are natural allies in the Asia-Pacific region, sharing common potential threats, particularly from China – which, concurrent with its economic advancement, has embarked on significant upgrading and modernization of its conventional forces and nuclear arsenal. There is also a strategic nexus with North Korea, which is problematic for Japan, and Pakistan, which is problematic for India.

By themselves neither North Korea nor Pakistan had the technological capability or financial resources to afford nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. These missiles in the case of North Korea cover the Japanese heartland and Okinawa and in the case of Pakistan cover the Indian heartland.

It is legitimate to question why China provided these deadly arsenals to failing states likes North Korea and Pakistan. The answer is obvious: China’s intentions have been to develop strategic pressure points by proxy in South Asia against India and in Northeast Asia against Japan.

This is all the more reason, therefore, why India and Japan must have strategic congruence.

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(Prakash Nanda is a journalist and editorial consultant for Indian Defense Review. He is also the author of “Rediscovering Asia: Evolution of India’s Look-East Policy.” He may be contacted at Prakash.nanda@hotmail.com. ©Copyright Prakash Nanda.)