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Considering the fact that most former U.S. presidents couldn’t come up with a stable policy toward China until much later in their administrations, after struggling with the relationship for some time, it is pleasant to see that U.S. President Barack Obama has determined his China policy after less than one year in office.

Then, can we say that Sino-U.S. relations have entered a new phase of strategic opportunity, and state with confidence that such relations will remain stable in the long term? It might be too early to draw such a conclusion.

The core characteristics of this bilateral relationship have not changed, and are of a dual nature – not only cooperative but also competitive. Under present circumstances, with the global financial crisis and the United States mired in a war in Afghanistan, shared interests between China and the United States are increasing and so is mutual cooperation, which is very natural.

But the situation could change, which would affect the interests of the two countries. Hence, although common interests have strengthened cooperation, we cannot base the long-term stability of Sino-U.S. relations on the foundation of these shared interests.

Even in the midst of cooperation, the United States is not letting down its guard against China. For example, the United States still maintains its powerful military strength in East Asia, still collects intelligence about China and still ignores Chinese sensitivities about sovereignty. When Obama returns to the United States he will still go ahead with a meeting with the Dalai Lama, despite the Chinese government’s objections.

Under such circumstances, if there were another event like the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on May 7, 1999, or the mid-air collision between a U.S. surveillance aircraft and China’s interceptor fighter jet on April 1, 2001, Sino-U. S. relations could experience a major setback. During the administration of former U.S. President Bill Clinton, the United States and China had established a constructive, strategic partnership. But the bomb that fell on China’s embassy in Belgrade destroyed that all at once.

Nevertheless, I still feel cautiously optimistic about Sino-U.S. relations. But this cautious optimism is not built on cooperation driven by concrete interests, but rather on structural causes.

First of all, the two countries are separated by the Pacific Ocean. Of course this is an era when geographical distances can be transcended; U.S. forces crossed the ocean and were deployed at China’s door long ago. But unlike relations between France and Germany or China and Japan, there is no thorny historical conflict between China and the United States. Also, East Asia is a critical interest of the United States, but not its core interest. As long as both sides exercise political wisdom and maintain a cooperative spirit, regional coexistence can be sustained.

Secondly, the relative positions of the United States and China are not on the same scale. In spite of China’s fast economic growth, the two countries are not comparable in terms of economic structure, quality of talent, technological level, etc. Thus, in essence, economic relations between the two are complementary. The goods that China exports in large quantities to the United States are not items produced in quantity domestically by U.S. companies.

As for U.S. trade protectionism, it’s a product of domestic political manipulation and does not reflect the current economic relationship between the two countries.

In terms of competing power, China is only a possible next-generation successor to the United States in terms of world hegemony. If China can realize that the 21st century will still be a U.S. century and be humble about its own development, and if the United States can calmly admit that its supremacy will eventually, inevitably come to an end, then the two sides can perhaps cooperate, or at least engage in “friendly competition,” as Obama put it.

Finally, seen from a historical perspective, neither China nor the United States is an expansionist nation. Since the 20th century, the United States has basically not been interested in gaining overseas territory, as its interests have lain in global free trade.

China has also lacked the desire to expand its territory. In ancient China, although the emperors expected small neighboring countries to “pledge allegiance” to them, the Chinese rulers mostly believed in the power of affecting people by adopting virtuous policies. Thus the Chinese emperors didn’t like to directly control the lands of the vassal states.

When expansions of Chinese territory did occur, it was under the dynasties controlled by other ethnic groups, not the majority Han. In ancient times these ethnic groups were not viewed as “Chinese,” as they are now.

The reason for New China, established in 1949, to stress territorial disputes with surrounding countries is more about a sense of nationalism born out of national humiliation in modern history. It is not out of self interest in taking others’ lands.

Based on this analysis, we have reason to expect that the transition of power from the United States to China can take place peacefully, not through war. Just as Obama declared, one country’s success is not necessarily at the expense of the other’s interests.

But, the premise for such an outcome is that both the leaders and people of China and the United States have a clear understanding, remain calm and endeavor to make this happen. Taking the dual nature of the Sino-U. S. relationship into consideration, which means conflicts of interest may still exist, both sides should not be blindly satisfied with pursuing transient interests and be prepared for accidental events, so that confrontations will not arise again.

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(Li Kaisheng teaches international relations at Xiangtan University in Xiangtan city, Hunan province, China. He holds a doctorate in law. This article is translated and edited from the Chinese by UPI Asia.com; the original may be found at http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4e20bb500100gavs.html ©Copyright Li Kaisheng.)