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India has refused for 30 years to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; it is discriminatory and hands advantages to big nuclear powers that possessed and tested weapons before 1967.

India has never agreed to the treaty terms. First, it knew that since 1971 Pakistan was working hard to develop its own nuclear weapons. Second, China has maintained a threatening posture on India’s northern borders. Third, nobody took India seriously as a power until it tested the nuclear bomb in 1998.

Presently, 181 countries have signed the CTBT, which is a successor of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that opened for signatures in 1970. The treaty has to be ratified by each country before it is enforced.

Some countries – including the United States, India, Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, China, Iran, Indonesia and North Korea – have failed either to sign or to ratify the treaty. Forty-four countries that have nuclear technology must sign and ratify it before it takes effect, but only 35 of these have done so.

The United States, the chief proponent of the treaty, is yet to ratify it. China’s last nuclear test was in 1996; by then it had already conducted 45 nuclear tests. It has signed the treaty but not ratified it.

During negotiations on the Indo-U.S. deal, an exception was made for India regarding the CTBT. When the deal was completed in October 2008, it was only a matter of time before it became operational. But then the Republicans lost the White House, and the Democrats under U.S. President Barrack Obama have now begun to look at the CTBT from a different angle, which in turn has delayed the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal from becoming operational.

The United States signed the CTBT in 1996, but has not yet ratified it. The U.S. Senate declined to do so in 1999. Since then the United States has lost the moral authority to persuade other nations to ratify it and dissuade them from testing.

With the Democrats in control of the U.S. Congress and the White House, Obama is keen to push for CTBT ratification. Reportedly, he has entrusted a number of personnel in his administration to make a strong case for Congress to ratify it.

This complicates things for India. If the United States ratifies the treaty, it will hold the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal as hostage. Then the issue will be back to square one, although India has approval from the Nuclear Suppliers Group to engage in nuclear trade with countries that have signed the CTBT. However, the United States has enough influence to persuade any supplier to toe its line.

The participation of the United States in the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal is very important, as it will smooth the transfer of nuclear technology and also investment to India. This will signal other U.S. businesses to set up shop in India, which India needs to keep its economy pacing at 10 percent annually.

Another setback for India was the call by the G-8 nations, during their July summit in Italy, for a broad ban on the transfer of nuclear reprocessing technology to non-CTBT/NPT countries. Although India put a brave face on the statement, the writing on the wall is clear – it will stand in the way of any transfer of nuclear technology to India.

It is unclear whether the NSG waiver to India supersedes the G-8 declaration. So delay upon delay is being heaped on India’s nuclear deal with the United States.

It is the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel that adds to the efficiency of nuclear power generation. The fissile materials recovered after a first pass through a nuclear reactor are sent back to the reactor to generate more energy. This also addresses disposal problems of highly radioactive materials after the first pass.

As much as 25 percent more energy is recovered with reprocessing. This is an essential element of the nuclear fuel cycle. But the G-8 declaration is essentially closing the door on the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal unless India signs the CTBT.

India could sign the CTBT and ratify it later, after the United States does. But recently a member of the nuclear team that detonated five nuclear devices in 1998 threw a spanner in the works by claiming – backed by a few other scientists – that one of the thermonuclear tests fizzled when only half of the nuclear material during the test actually burned.

A partial success is not unusual. In the past, it has happened in the United States and Russia. Now, as other noteworthy Indian scientists differ, it has ignited a fierce debate in India, which presumably points to a purpose – India has yet to perfect the thermonuclear device and so it should not sign the CTBT.

India could go ahead and do more tests, but this would lead to international ostracism and put a stop to the entire economic and political bonanza it is about to receive. Sanctions, which took three decades to untangle after India tested its nuclear capability in 1974, could be re-imposed.

This would put India’s economic activity in a tailspin, with 0 to -3 percent growth. All construction work to expand the Kudankulam and Kaiga nuclear power plants would stop. An alternative would be for India to rely on theoretical simulation tests like those undertaken by the United States. It is now known that India has such capability.

Although the primary goal of the United States is to get India to sign the CTBT, other issues are also delaying the nuclear deal. These include U.S. insistence that India enact legislation to guarantee safe passage to U.S. companies in the event of a nuclear accident. This implies the United States is trying to place the onus on Indian operators alone and not on U.S. technology or materials. This will be unacceptable to Indian politicians, as any crisis could face a court challenge from human rights activists.

Two U.S. multinational giants, General Electric and Westinghouse, are loath to enter the Indian market without the above liability safeguards. They do not wish to pay for another “Three Mile Island” type of accident like the one that occurred in the United States.

If India enacts the “Nuclear Liability Bill” as wished by the United States, it will open the door for U.S. companies to market their perfect – and imperfect – technologies. The United States has not built a nuclear power plant on U.S. soil in 30 years.

Indian opposition and nuclear watchdog groups want to know why Indian citizens should be treated any differently from U.S. citizens. In the United States companies are responsible for their deeds. This issue will invite another healthy debate, once the nuclear reprocessing issue is ironed out and liability legislation is introduced in the Indian Parliament. There are few things that favor India except its market size, which is causing U.S. multinationals to salivate.

Two other multinationals bidding for India’s civil nuclear contracts, France’s Areva and Russia’s Atom, are carefully watching the nuclear reprocessing debate. The latest G-8 declaration is also applicable to them. Although they have entered into supply contracts with India, they could be invalidated under pressure. The nuclear reactor liability issue is less applicable to them as these are fully or partially owned by their respective governments.

India has only one choice – to build coal-fired and gas-fired power plants – as it cannot compromise on its economic progress. If this is not acceptable to the West then it has choices to make. As for Indian detractors – including nuclear scientists – they will have to live with partially successful nuclear tests, as long as there was burn to indicate thermonuclear capability.

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(Hari Sud is a retired vice president of C-I-L Inc., a former investment strategies analyst and international relations manager. A graduate of Punjab University and the University of Missouri, he has lived in Canada for the past 34 years. ©Copyright Hari Sud.)