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The Sino-Vietnam border settlement followed a complicated history of relations between the two countries. Vietnam was once a tributary state under Chinese protection. This relationship lasted until 1885 when Vietnam came under French control following the Sino-French War.
During the Vietnam War of the 1960s, while the United States backed South Vietnam, for ideological and geopolitical reasons China supported North Vietnam, offering considerable support in terms of food, military supplies and personnel. After the war and the unification of Vietnam in 1976, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was formed.
Ridiculously, the two socialist countries went to war in 1979. The newly unified Vietnam allied with the Soviet Union, which was seeking domination in the region. China regarded this as a thorn in its side, and went to war with Vietnam both to send a warning to the Soviet Union and to punish Vietnam. China argued that its purpose was defensive.
When China and the Soviet Union reconciled with one another at the end of 1989, Sino-Vietnamese relations gradually followed suit. However, the relationship did not really warm up until the end of the 1990s, when the two decided to settle their border issues.
How could small Vietnam reach a compromise with the mighty China?
According to the theory of international relations known as offensive realism, military superiority will always propel a country to strive for greater gains in territorial negotiations. The U.S. political scholar Robert Gilpin also argued in his famous book, “War and Change in World Politics,” that rapid internal growth would propel states to redefine and expand their foreign interests.
China’s increasing national power and growth would surely make Vietnam suspicious as to Chinese motives in seeking to resolve the border issue with Vietnam.
In reality, China did not intentionally take advantage of its economic and military superiority. Instead, it has become less belligerent in bargaining with its neighbors. China even offered some concessions over territorial issues, particularly in the case of Russia. When the two countries concluded their border demarcation along the Heilongjiang River, China agreed that the border should run through Heixiazi Island, giving China only half of the island when it could have claimed the whole.
Professor M. Taylor Fravel, a Sinologist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has evaluated China’s approach to the resolution of territorial disputes. He concluded that China has had 23 territorial conflicts with other states, but has used force in only a few, while in 17 of these conflicts China has compromised or offered concessions.
In essence, China’s willingness to compromise in settling territorial issues derives from Chinese philosophy on governance. It can be attributed to the “good neighbor policy,” which regards relations with a close neighbor as more important than those with a distant relative.
Of course there are also geopolitical considerations behind China’s policy. But behind these lies the Chinese philosophical understanding of the relationship between powerful and small states, and the fact that a whole is composed of different parts.
Early Chinese thinking has lent wisdom to the country’s system of governance. The Chinese regarded the universe as functioning in a way similar to a clock; in order to run well its various parts must be coordinated. Good governance would make the universe, or the international system, run well, like a properly functioning clock. Hence whole-hearted submission to a ruler would keep the universe, or society, in order.
Therefore, Chinese rulers have never preferred coercion or war as a means of resolving conflict. Rather, these have been viewed as a means of last resort. Wars, regardless of their purpose, would result in hatred and endless confrontation, and were thus to be avoided.
In modern times, when the Chinese did engage in skirmishes with other countries, such as the Soviet Union or India, they never called these “wars.” Instead they referred to them as defensive or punishing actions. When China did take aggressive action it never pushed it to the point of full occupation. This was shown in its border wars with India in 1962, with the Soviet Union in 1969 and with Vietnam in 1979. China did not go so far as to occupy the Indian or Vietnamese capitals in order to save face for those countries.
Worth mentioning is that modern Chinese leaders have inherited this ancient thinking and integrated it with their “new security concept,” a term that originates with the Copenhagen School of security studies, which holds that the security of each actor in a region is interrelated with the security of other actors.
This new security concept also goes along with the interdependence theory in the era of globalization. Chinese leaders have increasingly become aware that sovereignty cannot be constrained to regaining or seizing their lost territories. To some extent, the capability of exercising force is needed for multinational engagement and participation in regional and global security.
Although most of its land border disputes have been resolved, China still has a number of unresolved sea border issues. The question is whether China will take the same approach to settling these disputes, which involve huge potential resources including fish, oil and gas.
China’s attitude is likely to depend on the flexibility of the countries concerned, as well as its own internal concerns. Too much compromise or concession could spark a backlash of nationalistic fervor among Chinese citizens. Therefore Chinese policymakers have to be cautious and take this into consideration.
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(Dr. Zhang Quanyi is associate professor at Zhejiang Wanli University in Ningbo, China, and a guest researcher at the Center for the Study of Non-traditional Security and Peaceful Development at Zhejiang University in Hangzhou. His research interest revolves around the creation of a world state. He can be contacted at qyzhangupi@gmail.com. ©Copyright Zhang Quanyi.)
now try ths ask that his whole plot is his use other ways(assuming he is weak) he will even give you a yard but what if strong war....