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These people have to brave many perils in trekking the long distances to safety in the face of the LTTE’s continuing refusal to let them leave. The plight of the 300,000 to 400,000 civilians trapped in the war zones is a cost of war that the government cannot ignore. Most of them are displaced and living in terrible conditions of hardship in makeshift temporary shelters. Even worse, they are subjected to enforced recruitment by the LTTE to fight a war they do not necessarily wish to fight.
If the government is conducting a humanitarian operation it needs to be concerned about the plight of these civilians. This was one of the points raised at an international interreligious conference organized by the World Conference on Religions for Peace and the National Peace Council this weekend in Anuradhapura called "A multi-religious response to the humanitarian crisis."
The government's position is that it is doing its best by the people trapped in the war zones. It has repeatedly announced that civilians should leave the LTTE-controlled areas and come to safe zones that the government has arranged for them. It has dropped leaflets from the air on LTTE-controlled territory to inform the people of the availability of these safe places and urge the people to leave.
In the meantime, it has been sending in relief supplies with international monitoring, up to a point, into the LTTE-controlled areas. But even with that there have been tussles, as the recent dispute between the government and the International Committee of the Red Cross over the distribution of Indian aid suggests.
So far, the response to the government's invitation for people to leave the LTTE-controlled areas has been poor, if numbers of those who have actually left are taken as the criterion of receptivity. Although there are people who are coming into the government-controlled areas, this is still a trickle relative to the numbers that remain. A major reason would be that the LTTE is not giving the people permission to move out even if they wish to. As the government's offer to the people has been made without the agreement of the LTTE, it can be expected that the LTTE will counter this by denying the people permission to leave.
On the other hand, if the people continue to remain in the LTTE-controlled areas, they will be vulnerable to shortages of relief supplies, to forcible recruitment by the LTTE and to collateral damage due to military confrontations. So far, the people have been able to flee from the areas of battle to areas that are farther away.
It appears that the government is now focusing its efforts on Kilinochchi. After Kilinochchi, the government will probably move into the eastern sector of LTTE-controlled territory, which is its last remaining area, where both the people and the LTTE are going to be bottled up together.
In this context, it is incumbent on the government, which has designated its present military operations as humanitarian, to find a solution to the problem of the people trapped in the war zone. The religious leaders at the Anuradhapura conference addressed this issue as the main item on the agenda. They also discussed the possibility of facilitating discussions with both the government and the LTTE regarding safeguarding the civilian population. They agreed to address both the issues of a mutually acceptable safe haven for the people and a humanitarian corridor for the movement of people and supplies.
The proposed multi-religious initiative to address the humanitarian crisis would fulfill three important criteria for success. First, it would not be a unilateral decision, but would be directed at obtaining the agreement of both sides through a process of discussion. The government has rejected both pressure from the state of Tamil Nadu in India and the LTTE's unilateral offer of a ceasefire, in the belief that the LTTE is seeking to secure an advantage by giving itself time to rearm and regroup. In a similar way, the LTTE has ignored the government's offer of a humanitarian corridor.
There is a problem with unilateral offers, whether of ceasefires or humanitarian corridors. Often the party to which the offer is made without prior discussion suspects that it will be disadvantaged by accepting such an offer. In this context, the offer of the religious leaders to facilitate discussions between the two sides on the humanitarian issue could meet the concerns of both in a mutually acceptable manner. Discussion and dialogue may also open up new opportunities for change, and change of heart, which is the supreme realm of religion and spirituality.
There are two further benefits of a religious intervention to secure the humanitarian interests of the people. Due to the LTTE's practice of conscripting one or more members of every family to be part of their cadre, there is understandable reluctance on the part of at least some of the civilians in the LTTE-controlled areas to come out and expose themselves to the Sri Lankan security forces. However, the presence of religious leaders who will be watching over the proposed safety zones will be the best possible guarantee of their safety from unwarranted harassment.
It is likely that even a multi-religious initiative to resolve the humanitarian crisis will require international support and technical expertise as a backup. However, the legitimacy that religious leaders have within their own communities can give a multi-religious initiative greater legitimacy with the general population than an initiative undertaken by any international third party.
A humanitarian process steered by nationally recognized religious leaders has the best chance of gaining national acceptance and catalyzing a change of heart that recognizes the sanctity of human life as the supreme value.
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(Dr. Jehan Perera is executive director of the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, an independent advocacy organization. He studied economics at Harvard College and holds a doctorate in law from Harvard Law School. ©Copyright Jehan Perera.)
