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This was not the first time the Sri Lankan president has had to face a quizzical if not skeptical international community on his journeys abroad. About a year ago, when Rajapaksa met with Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda in Tokyo and met with similar expressions of concern about the situation in the country due to war, the president pledged his commitment to a political solution to the ethnic conflict. But a month after meeting the Japanese prime minister, the president abrogated the Ceasefire Agreement, paving the way to all-out war.

Despite the president’s pledge to treat the Tamils with every care, they continue to be displaced in the ongoing battles in the north, with no sign of these battles subsiding and a political process resuming. In addition, Tamil people throughout the country continue to live under threat to their personal security on several counts, including being suspected as members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

They are also vulnerable to intra-Tamil fighting and to conscription by the LTTE. The high level of publicity given in the government-controlled media to the recapture of Pooneryn in the north indicates that the government places its emphasis on the military in dealing with the LTTE.

But an equally important, if not more important, benefit to the government has been the political mileage to maintain itself in office. The government has been able to make its military progress the most important national issue of the day.

The capture of the northern town of Pooneryn came the day of the second reading of the national budget in Parliament. Government spokespersons urged the people to raise the national flag to celebrate the victory. Despite increased economic problems, the government was able to pass the hurdle of the second reading of the budget without much difficulty.

The government’s continued record of military and political victories is undoubtedly important to itself. But for it to be positively constructive to the country, and to the people, it needs to be accompanied by a strategy of building national consensus and engaging in conflict resolution. Unfortunately neither of these two higher goals appears to be in sight.

The polity is fragmented, with the opposition marginalized by the government and powerless to contribute in a constructive manner. Large numbers of people continue to be displaced in the north. There is a concentration of power in the government, including a practice of impunity that has made opposition to the government a dangerous endeavor.

While the military victory at Pooneryn is significant, it suggests a strategy to encircle the LTTE, rather than a linear movement to its heartland. With the LTTE’s main military assets still intact, and repositioned in the eastern or left side of the mainland north, the strategy of encirclement is also likely to take more time.

The LTTE will find itself hard pressed to obtain resources to continue with the fight. The government for its part will need to sustain the economy and face elections. If a further deterioration of the humanitarian situation is to be averted, there needs to be an internal commitment to political change on both sides of the divide.

In these circumstances, Sri Lanka has become an example of the limits of international pressure. Observing this situation, Professor Jayadeva Uyangoda has pointed to the frequent inability of international pressure to induce change within countries. Often international pressure can be counterproductive, as it is easily seen as an infringement of a country’s sovereignty. This enables governments to rely on the people’s support to oppose such affronts to national dignity. In addition, governments can expel offending diplomats and foreign aid workers, and can also seek new allies.

A realization of the limits of international pressure, however, is not the only reason for the generally acquiescent attitude of the international community to the continuing military campaigns of the government. Another factor is the loss of faith, nationally as well as internationally, in the LTTE’s willingness to engage in political negotiations that would have the objective of a united Sri Lanka in which democracy is restored to the north and east. There is hope expressed that the government will initiate positive political changes in the aftermath of the military defeat of the LTTE.

At present there appear to be two schools of thought within the international community regarding the situation in the country. There are those who feel it is futile to pressure the government to come up with an immediate political package, or even one before the end of the military conflict. They are prepared to see the conflict resolution process as a continuum to proceed stage by stage, with first a military victory followed subsequently by a political solution. Some of them are investing heavily in the development of the east, which they see as a model that could be replicated in the north.

On the other hand, there is a second school of thought that believes in the need to impose conditions on the government to push it in the direction of a political solution. So far there has been little success on this count. The government’s refusal to permit the European Union to send human rights evaluators into the country prior to deciding on their GSP+ tariff concession is an example.

The better option for the international community might be to support initiatives from the government, opposition, civil society and the diaspora for national consensus, good governance and political reform. Giving support to initiatives rather than to parties would be the better way to support Sri Lanka at the present time.

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(Dr. Jehan Perera is executive director of the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, an independent advocacy organization. He studied economics at Harvard College and holds a doctorate in law from Harvard Law School. ©Copyright Jehan Perera.)