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This commentator has long held that the post-1979 clerical leadership in Iran cannot be trusted with the possession of radioactive material, for the ideology of the mullahcracy is as compatible with the use of "dirty" bombs as is that of the Pakistan army, which has long leaned toward such "asymmetric" tactics against its foes.
Only if Iran were a secular democracy on the model of Turkey would it be safe for the international community to allow Tehran to have a nuclear industry of its own, and at present that seems some distance away. Genuine experts – as opposed to those who in 2002 created a drumbeat for war in Iraq – say that Iran is still at least a dozen years away from building a stockpile that could enable it to craft a bomb, although only about two years away from generating enough radioactive material for "dirty" bombs.
An Israeli attack would generate such anti-Jewish hatred within the region – and elsewhere – that the fires it would create would be difficult to put out.
Within the universe of jihad, thus far only the Sunni Wahabbists have mobilized against the rest of the world, principally the United States and the European Union. Their Shiite counterparts have only one non-Muslim country in their sights, and this is Israel – a consequence of Ariel Sharon's 1982 intervention on the side of the Christian Maronites against the Shiites in Lebanon.
Thus far, the Shiite terror groups have concentrated less on Israel than on their domestic rivals for control of the territories in which they operate – Lebanon and the Palestinian zones. In Iraq as well, a similar situation is in effect, and the ceasefire by the Shiites has ensured the damping of casualty figures to a level which enables the (incorrect) argument that it is the surge in U.S. troop presence rather than intra-Iraqi understandings that has kept Coalition fatalities low.
Should there be an Israeli attack on Iran, the focus of the Shiite terror groups would immediately shift to Israel, and to Western targets more generally, throughout the Middle East, with negative consequences for the security of both. The mullahcracy in Tehran may also be tempted to abandon its ceasefire with pro-Western sheikhdoms such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman – with Qatar and the United Arab Emirates falling in a separate category.
In Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, there is likely to be an intensification of protests against the rulers, a manifestation that could soon metastize into violence. Although the pro-Western sheikhdoms were – outside the view of television cameras – rooting robustly for the removal of Saddam Hussein, they are not enthusiastic about an attack on Iran.
Unlike the Saddamites, the mullahcracy in Tehran has developed sizeable networks within the Middle East that can be activated at any time of their choosing. Aware that a direct assault by long-range missiles on Israel may lead to a devastating response from that state, the mullahs may decide to act through subversion rather than conventional military means, launching a low-intensity conflict against local sheikhdoms while ratcheting up their terror war on Israel.
According to the cheerleaders of the 2003 attack on Iraq, Saddam Hussein concealed the fact that he had no weapons of mass destruction. This is an untruth. The reality is that the spokespersons of the dictator repeatedly stated that their WMD had been destroyed or moved from Iraq. In contrast, Tehran has a stockpile of chemical warheads, although as yet no other type of WMD.
However, given the vastly disproportionate nature of an Israeli military reaction to a chemical attack by Iran, the odds are that only conventional payloads would be used, and that too mainly to prove a point – that Tehran has the means to reach into Israel, just as the reverse situation is true.
Given the immense wealth of the mullahcracy, they would be loath to incinerate it by a WMD attack on Israel or on U.S. targets. As for the passage of ships, keeping open its sea route is vital to the economic health of Iran. It is aware that the destruction of its naval capability would be the consequence it a serious effort was made by the small Iranian navy to block the straits. Rhetoric to the contrary from Tehran seems to be precisely that – rhetoric.
However, the absence of a conventional Iranian countermove does not mean that a military attack is the best option. A military strike may over the next decade create as deadly a backwash as the post-conflict tactics of the U.S. in Iraq.
Instead, what is needed is for the international community to give its support to the EU-Russia proposal to build nuclear power plants in Iran under complete international supervision. Should this offer be made in a credible manner, both the financial interests of the mullacracy as well as the war-weary Iranian public would tilt toward its acceptance.
By his often goofy assertions of Iranian omnipotence, President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad is showing himself to be in dire need of a reality check. While Iran has the capability to damage at least the security interests of key sheikhdoms, and over time degrade the safety of Israel, yet this would come at a cost fatal for the mullahs in economic terms due to military counterattack by the United States and its partners.
What is needed is a face-saving exit from a confrontation that since 2004 has helped only the oil exporting countries and corporations, an exit that gives Iran nuclear power while denying the mullahs access to nuclear materials. As a sweetener, acceptance of such a proposal could be followed by long-denied technological help to Iran to augment its production and refining capacity.
The greater the prosperity that is created in that country, the higher the cost to the mullahs of any step that could lead to a military strike on Iran. What is needed is engagement, not isolation.
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(Professor M.D. Nalapat is vice-chair of the Manipal Advanced Research Group, UNESCO Peace Chair, and professor of geopolitics at Manipal University. ©Copyright M.D. Nalapat.)
