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Although the Iraqi dictator's sulfurous rhetoric never ceased, he began to steadily destroy his offensive capabilities, believing that this would preserve him from a second attack. Although most Western statespersons and analysts claim that Hussein "deceived international opinion by pretending to a WMD capability that did not exist," Iraqi spokespersons themselves repeatedly stated that their weapons of mass destruction had become history.
The reality remains that the Iraqi authorities began to completely dismantle their already-degraded stockpiles after Husayn Kamil al-Majed, son-in-law of Saddam Hussein, was honey-trapped into defecting to Jordan in 1995. Since then, remaining stockpiles were systematically destroyed, as became clear to most intelligence agencies save those interested in keeping alive the myth of Hussein’s WMD capability to ensure continued good behavior on the part of the Gulf sheikhdoms, all of whom were terrified of Saddam Hussein and therefore tacked close to the United States.
Superb – and largely unacknowledged – work by the U.S. Treasury has resulted in a drying-up of funds to Osama bin Laden and other like-minded fanatics. Bin Laden himself is believed to be making payouts of roughly US$300,000 each month to local chiefs in order to buy continued protection for his entourage, which must be leaving very little to bolster his offensive capabilities.
Although he was reportedly in southern Afghanistan till 2004, he is believed to have relocated to Waziristan in Pakistan, where he was apparently shifted to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir in 2007 in order to negate allegations of complicity with longtime acquaintances in the Pakistan military.
Just as only a hopelessly besotted George W. Bush and his vice president would believe Musharraf when he claimed that nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan made at least 218 shipments of sensitive missile and nuclear material into and out of Pakistan all by himself, it is difficult to deny that bin Laden – and his substantial entourage, now numbering around 60 – could not have evaded capture in Pakistan had the army genuinely sought to capture him.
The same sources that informed this columnist in 2003 of a likely assassination attempt on Musharraf – a forecast that he published in the Indian newsweekly Sahara Time – have claimed that an understanding exists between bin Laden and friends in the Pakistan army that no attack would be conducted on U.S. territory, and in exchange for such forbearance, he would continue to be allowed to remain at large. They further claim that this understanding has been confined to bin Laden and his friends within Pakistan, and has not included the United States, which therefore remains unaware of the Faustian bargain made with the wily ex-sheikh.
Should another attack on the U.S. homeland take place, pressure on Pakistan to capture bin Laden would be too much to withstand, unlike events after 9/11, when the Pakistan army's role was quickly overlooked and they were co-opted to put out a fire that they themselves had created and nurtured.
In the chaotic years after 9/11, the Inter-Services Intelligence was able to divert U.S. assistance to favored individuals in southern Afghanistan, who by 2006 had become the nucleus of fresh resistance to NATO. Subsequently, anti-Taliban Northern Alliance leaders were displaced from the team of President Hamid Karzai, and replaced by others who favored a softer approach to the Taliban. Much of the present deterioration in the ground situation in that country can be tracked to wrong decisions made by NATO during 2001-04, as a result of advice from the Pakistan army.
As for the sources mentioned, their credibility cannot be brushed aside in light of the fact that two assassination attempts were indeed made against Musharraf in 2003, a few months after their prediction was announced. Hence, their story of such an informal understanding between bin Laden and his friends in Pakistan cannot be ruled out.
It is true that thus far, there has been no al-Qaida attack on the U.S. homeland since 9/11. However, this may be due to lack of ability – caused by superb policing by the Federal Bureau of Investigation – rather than an absence of intention. As for the bombings in London and Spain, these are believed to be the responsibility of copycats with no organizational contact with bin Laden. The term "al-Qaida" is today used as a generic term to define the origins of almost any attack conducted by Wahabbi extremists. To that extent, bin Laden continues to be credited for actions in which he has had no role.
What is clear is that bin Laden, through his Sancho Panza, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has been swift to claim credit for any mass terror attack. Al-Zawahiri has made several references to the ongoing violence in Iraq, and reports talk of an "al-Qaida in Iraq." However, most such actions seem to have been motivated less by adherence to Wahabbi extremist ideology than to resentment at the occupation of the country by foreign troops.
It is telling that security has improved precisely in those sectors where – following the sensible British lead under Prime Minister Gordon Brown – U.S. troops have handed responsibility for policing to Iraqi forces, thereafter keeping a much lower profile. Of course, General David Petraeus and his backers credit the lower casualty figures to precisely the opposite – an increase in U.S. troop strength.
Those active in maintaining longstanding linkages between jihadis and some elements of the Pakistan army claim that bin Laden has been in deteriorating physical health since 1997, and that his condition worsened after 2005, requiring constant medical attention. They are unwilling to speculate on his longevity, stating – no doubt with justification – that such "decisions" are in the hands of a Higher Power than either Bush or Musharraf.
However, should the fugitive from Tora Bora actually be in a near-terminal state, the danger is that he may seek to depart this world in the clouds of another mega-terrorist act. Paradoxically, therefore, the international community may be less, rather than more, secure as a consequence of a possible physical collapse of bin Laden.
If bin Laden passes away without another major strike, it would reinforce the view of those who argue that his failure to seriously disrupt life in target countries indicates that his ideology and actions do not have divine blessing, and that they are instead motivated by the devil in order to tarnish the fair name of Islam.
After witnessing the example made of Saddam Hussein, it would be rash to expect Osama bin Laden to follow the Tikriti's lead in dismantling offensive capabilities. Now that those tracking him within Pakistan say that he may be close to his final days, sustained vigilance is needed to ensure that the man who has defamed a great faith and brought unmerited suspicion on an enlightened and moderate worldwide religious community departs not with a bang, but with a whimper.
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(Professor M.D. Nalapat is vice-chair of the Manipal Advanced Research Group, UNESCO Peace Chair, and professor of geopolitics at Manipal University. ©Copyright M.D. Nalapat.)
