Pragmatism needed in aid for North Korea

By Lee Jae Young
Column: Seoul Insights

Published: June 19, 2008

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Seoul, South Korea —

As announced by the World Food Program, North Korea is suffering a grave shortage of food and facing a famine; thus outside support has become critical for the country’s survival. The South Korean government may expect that it can gain an advantage by bargaining with the North about aid now, due to its dire situation.

However, it is too early to jump to conclusions. The time has come when the North is in a position to rule out the South as a negotiating partner, more than at any previous time. This real possibility has arisen because Seoul has gradually become more isolated since the new government of Lee Myung-bak was instated.

One distinctive aspect of Lee’s pragmatist North Korean policy, as opposed to his predecessors’ policies, is the hard-line approach toward the North. This feature is clearly shown in two measures. First, South Korea’s economic aid is provided contingent upon the North’s cooperation with denuclearization. This is the “Vision 2020” scheme.

Second, Lee’s government has sought U.N. resolutions and sanctions against the North, in an attempt to push it into returning abducted South Korean citizens and detained soldiers. However, it seems now very unlikely that Lee’s North Korean policy will pay off. The distance between North and South has expanded too much to allow them to sit together at a negotiating table.

As North Korea has made substantial progress in denuclearization so far, there has been an expectation that economic cooperation will resume soon. But this is not likely. Even though the South Korean government expressed its willingness to provide food aid to the North a few months ago, Lee’s hard-line policy has already provoked the North to turn its back on the South. It is highly possible the North will not respond to the South, judging that South Korea is no longer a valuable partner in negotiations.

There have been warnings ever since Lee took office that his hard-line approach could result in Seoul’s isolation from North Korea’s sphere of international relationships. This is called North Korea’s “Tongmibongnam” strategy. This strategy becomes effective if North Korea’s priorities in its relationship with South Korea are outweighed by its priorities in its relationship with the United States.

Since last year’s Feb. 13 agreement, North Korea has cooperated with the United States in the denuclearization process within the six-party framework. The United States has rewarded the North with promises of food and energy support, the removal of North Korea from the terrorist-sponsor list and exemption from application of the Trading with the Enemy Act. Another channel for receiving food is also open to the North through the World Food Program. In contrast to these softening attitudes, the South Korean government under Lee has maintained its hard-line approach to the North.

Consequently, South Korea has become relatively much less valuable to North Korea and is given a much lower priority. Therefore, the South Korean government cannot safely expect that it will have the upper-hand in attempting to negotiate with the North. The remaining hope, with luck, might be avoiding permanent disconnection from North Korea.

It is worth learning lessons from U.S. President George W. Bush. Until the end of 2006, Bush also pursued a hawkish policy toward North Korea. However, when he determined that it was necessary to change the policy direction, he did so, even though he had to go through an internal backlash within his own party and from other politicians. As a result, he achieved some success in normalizing the U.S. relationship with the North and in reducing the nuclear threat.

North Korea is in desperate need of outside help. But it is apparent that Lee’s government gains no advantage by offering help. Lee should realize that the current situation signals the necessity for his government to adjust its overall approach to the North. Lee should redirect his pragmatic North Korean policy, particularly now, in his policy of providing food aid.

Recently some North Korean human-rights organizations in South Korea have objected to any immediate humanitarian aid to North Korea for the reason that such help would be a waste of South Korean taxpayers’ money, and would not produce any meaningful restoration of human rights. Their argument makes moral sense but does not sound realistic.

Lee’s government and civil organizations should recognize that their strict, hard-line approach may endanger the fundamental relationship between South and North Korea if the North at last settles on the “Tongmibongnam” strategy. Then, there will be no role left for South Korea to play to contribute to the economic development and progress in human rights in the North.

The South Korean president should not hesitate in seeking to avoid isolation from the North. He should start with softening his overall approach toward the North as a way to convince it that the South is still a valuable partner. This could work – if it is not too late – as Bush’s example has shown. If Lee’s government still sincerely hopes to provide the North with humanitarian aid, this is the only remaining choice.

(Lee Jae Young is a freelance writer and citizen reporter for Ohmynews International. He has a master's degree from Cornell University Law School in Ithaca, New York. ©Copyright Lee Jae Young.)