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Despite all the security systems being set up in Colombo and elsewhere, and the deployment of security forces which seem omnipresent, it is virtually impossible to safeguard the civilian population against LTTE attacks. Colombo remains an open city with a multi ethnic and diverse population representing what Sri Lanka is struggling to remain and be. Investigations have revealed that the most unexpected persons regardless of ethnicity could be assisting the LTTE, sometimes out of conviction, sometimes for financial gain. So long as the LTTE is organized to wage war against the state and to commit injury to all and sundry as it suits its purpose, it will be very difficult for the government to put an end to their terror campaign by security means alone.
One explanation for the civilian bombings is the pressure that the LTTE is coming under in their remaining stronghold of the Wanni. The visible progress of the Sri Lankan military into the Wanni strongholds of the LTTE is slower than the government had initially promised. But it appears to be continuing steadily, albeit at high cost to both sides.The threats and assaults on journalists who question the military campaign indicate the stresses on the government side. These stresses must surely be even greater within the LTTE, which is on the back foot.
The generally accepted explanation for the LTTE’s terror campaign is that it is trying to distract the government from its main objective of capturing the Wanni. A major increase in the tension between the multi ethnic communities living in different parts of the country or a communal riot as occurred 25 years ago in 1983, may require troops to be brought back from the northern battlefields to protect the peace in the south. It is also possible that the attacks on Colombo could be connected to a more long term calculation of the LTTE to reduce international support to the government by provoking more human rights abuses. More restrictive practices against Tamil civilians, including human rights violations against them in the campaign against terror, could put the government in the dock once again, as in the post 1983 period.
What is noteworthy is the full circle that the LTTE has traversed in seeking to make its impact by attacking civilian targets. Their actions in the mid 1980s and thereafter when they attacked civilian targets in addition to military ones led them to be branded internationally as one of the most vicious terrorist organizations in the world. But from 2000 onwards the LTTE appeared to have graduated to a more conventional military force that did not target civilians to cause terror. In the midst of major conventional battles that led to hundreds of combatants being killed there appeared to be an informal agreement that civilians would not be targeted. This helped in the confidence-building process that finally led to the Ceasefire Agreement of 2002 which gave primacy to political means of conflict resolution.
It may be a sign of the tremendous military pressure that the LTTE is under that once again the spectra of vicious terror strikes against civilians has re-emerged. On the other hand, the LTTE may also be reacting to the civilian killings within the areas of their control in the Wanni by air strikes but more particularly by a series of claymore mine explosions. Like in the case of the attacks in Moratuwa and Kebetigollewa, these have been remotely detonated and targeted against civilians. In the past three weeks, at least three such attacks have been reported, with 16 civilian deaths being reported in one incident. The LTTE has claimed that these attacks have been done by the Deep Penetration Units of the government, which the government has strongly denied.
Attacks against civilians living under LTTE control would be a serious blow to their claim that they are the sole protectors of the Tamil people. The government has pointed to the possibility that these civilian killings by claymore mine attack deep within LTTE controlled territory is the result of internal splits and infighting between different factions of the LTTE. The government has also pointed out that its air strikes are the result of careful planning and that the pilots have reported that they successfully hit the LTTE targets that were intended. In the absence of opportunities for independent verification it is impossible to know the ground realities.
There is academic theory backed by statistical analysis to show that in situations of escalation and reprisal, if one of the parties foreseeing the disaster that is to befall both, decides to de-escalate, and is met by a cooperative response, the vicious cycle of escalation can be reversed. As in the past, de-escalation can lead to a positive cycle in which trust grows. The government being the responsible party for protecting civilian life all over the country needs to consider the de-escalation option. As a first step it could obtain the services of trusted intermediaries, either local or international, to communicate with the LTTE its desire to safeguard civilian life in all parts of the country, including the Wanni, even as the war is being fought.
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(Dr. Jehan Perera is executive director of the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, an independent advocacy organization. He studied economics at Harvard College and holds a doctorate in law from Harvard Law School. ©Copyright Jehan Perera.)
