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Although the U.S. conciliatory policy toward North Korea has wavered a bit since the end of last year, Japanese experts point out that the Bush administration, which is keen for a prompt diplomatic achievement, may compromise on the nuclear declaration.
A year has passed since delegates to the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear programs reached an agreement in February 2007 on a deal that would shut down and seal three nuclear facilities, including reprocessing facilities, in Yongbyon. The first phase of the agreement, including the suspension of North Korea's nuclear programs, has been completed and Pyongyang is now undertaking the task of the second phase, which requires a complete declaration of all its nuclear programs and disablement of all existing nuclear facilities. However, the process is at an impasse since Pyongyang missed the December deadline for the declaration.
Early this month, U.S. Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell said in a statement to the Senate Intelligence Committee that the U.S. intelligence community believes North Korea, despite its denial, continues to engage in uranium enrichment and to sell weapons around the world. If this is true, the United States would not remove North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism, one of the promised rewards for Pyongyang's denuclearization.
Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Feb. 6, U.S. nuclear envoy Christopher Hill said the United States would not remove North Korea from the list until "we have really had very close consultations with the Japanese government." However, some Japanese experts warn that the United States might still compromise with North Korea.
"In the conflict between the White House and the secretary of state, if the power of resistance of Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney has weakened for any reason, there is still a possibility that the government may shift to a conciliatory approach again," said Yoichi Shimada, a scholar of international politics at Fukui Prefectural University in Obama, southern Japan.
Last month, Bush did not mention North Korea in his State of the Union Address. Compared to his first speech in 2002, in which Bush called North Korea part of an "axis of evil" and demanded that the country end its support for terrorism, the export of missiles and the development of weapons of mass destruction, U.S. pressure on the communist country has greatly diminished.
"Since the Bush administration keeps the option to compromise, Bush did not refer to North Korea in his State of the Union Address," said Masao Okonogi, a professor at Keio University in Tokyo and an expert on Korean affairs. "I think the possibility that the United States comes to a compromise within February still remains," Okonogi said at press briefing in Tokyo last month. Japan should prepare for all possibilities, he added.
Many Japanese observers are distrustful of the U.S. government because of the dramatic change in its policy toward North Korea. The Clinton administration, which was seeking a diplomatic achievement due to the failure of its Middle East peace efforts, appeared to make rapid progress with Pyongyang right before giving up the reins of government. In October 2002, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright went to Pyongyang and met with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il.
Although her talks with the absolute ruler were seen as preparation for a possible visit by President Bill Clinton, Albright's attendance with Kim of an unscheduled performance of the "Mass Games," seen as a symbol of the autocratic state, was highly criticized by the U.S. media. The media criticized her indiscretion in commenting favorably on the games, saying she had given silent approval to North Korea's nuclear development and suppression of human rights. Clinton's visit did not become a reality and his conciliatory policy ended in failure for lack of time.
According to Shimada, Hill and other officials in the U.S. State Department are networking among members of Congress, seeking approval for the removal of North Korea from the list of terrorism-sponsoring states. But most members of Congress will not agree to this as long as Pyongyang's declaration of its nuclear programs is dishonest, he said.
If the Bush administration is seeking to accomplish denuclearization of the Korean peninsula by January next year, the scheme is very likely to fail, like his predecessor's. When leaders of liberal societies are driven by haste to negotiate with the North, they face a high possibility of failure because Kim Jong Il will exploit their weakness in wanting to conclude a deal during their term of office, South Korean experts have explained. In short, the leaders will be forced to adjust to Kim's pace, and oil or other assistance will be taken by Pyongyang without any progress on nuclear or human rights issues.
Japan, which has faced this strategy in trying to deal with the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea, has determined to strengthen ties with incoming South Korean President Lee Myung-bak's administration to put pressure on North Korea. Lee has pledged to seek a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. Japan's economic sanctions against the North will expire in April, but it is sure to extend the bill if there is no progress on the nuclear or abduction issues.
Pyongyang must include three points in its declaration: the number and type of nuclear weapons it possesses and their location; details of its uranium-enrichment project; and its activities in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, there are other issues to be clarified regarding state sponsorship of terrorism. One is nuclear cooperation with Syria, and another concerns the victims kidnapped from South Korea, Japan and other countries by North Korean agents. Abductees' support groups suspect that at least 100 Japanese were kidnapped and the South Korean government estimates that around 480 South Korean were kidnapped to the North in the 1970s and 1980s.
Japanese experts have called into question a U.S. approach to negotiations that seeks quick achievements.
"A compromise draft, such as disablement of North Korea's three nuclear facilities, not dismantlement, is putting the cart before the horse," said Tetsuya Endo, former vice-chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan and former representative of the Japanese government on North Korea Normalization Talks. In a normal situation, a declaration of nuclear programs should come first, followed by an inspection to verify the facts. Then, negotiations to dismantle the facilities should start, Endo said.
"In my understanding, disablement lies midway between dismantlement and a freeze. According to the explanation of the U.S. side, their definition of disablement seems that it will be impossible for North Korea to restart those facilities within a year, but such a very short term will be over as quick as a wink," Endo said. Even though compromise may be inevitable, a roadmap toward dismantlement of all facilities should be announced, Endo said, in addition to recognizing that plutonium production has been suspended.
If the United States and North Korea fail to reach a compromise, the negotiations may remain deadlocked until a new U.S. administration takes office, or the United States may step up pressure against North Korea. One U.S. option would be to strengthen financial sanctions against North Korea, which have been effective in prodding Pyongyang toward progress in the past.
"North Korea's reaction may be extreme if the United States does not compromise," Okonogi said.
Many Japanese experts believe that North Korea will never fully reveal the extent and location of its nuclear programs, fearing that such a revelation would threaten the regime's continued existence.
"Even though it is very difficult to force North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons, Japan, South Korea and the United States must work together and never give up," Endo said.
