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This is a problem that an earlier government headed by President Chandrika Kumaratunga also faced when it waged its ultimately unsuccessful "War for Peace" from 1995 to 2001 on a two-fold platform of war and political reform. One prong tended to undercut the other.
It was pointed out that having government-sponsored peace plays in schools did not help when it came to recruiting youth into the armed forces. At the same time, atrocities committed on the military battlefields or due to terror strikes served to harden sentiment against political compromise. Kumaratunga's personal commitment to the devolution of power as a solution to the ethnic conflict helped to maintain a balance. Such a balance is not evident at the present time.
So far the government's best offer appears to be limited to one of full implementation of the existing Provincial Council system that was established two decades ago in 1987 as an outcome of the Indo Lanka Peace Accord. Unfortunately the 20-year experience of the Provincial Council system is that it has been deficient as a means of devolving real power to the regions.
The two key requirements of genuine devolution of power are not found within the 13th Amendment that set up the Provincial Councils. The first is that decision-making power that is devolved should not be undermined by actions of the central government. The second is the provision of adequate resources to enable the regional authorities to make a real difference to the lives of the people.
In addition, the radical element within the 13th Amendment that gave it a new dimension of power sharing was the notion of the temporary merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces. Successive governments did not wish to disturb that merger because they realized it represented the most important compromise between those who had fought to divide the country and those who fought to keep it united. Today, however, the possibility of the 13th Amendment being the basis of a solution to the ethnic conflict is further undermined by the de-merger of the two provinces last year.
Therefore, in the present circumstances of the Northern and Eastern provinces being separate and the government stepping up its military offensive in the north, the prospects for any sort of political solution are extremely bleak. The prospect facing the country is escalated warfare without any agreement on the political solution.
The mere promise of full implementation of the 13th Amendment is unlikely to evoke a positive response either from the Tamil community, the international community or those sections of the Sri Lankan polity who have not been co-opted by the government.
However, the government continues to act as if it believes that the international community will acquiesce in its plans to bring the ethnic conflict to an end after defeating the LTTE on the military battlefield. The government appears to be counting on the international antipathy to terrorist entities as epitomized in the U.S.-led global "War on Terror" and to the near total loss of international sympathy for the LTTE. It appears that at the present time the LTTE has no external support except from the Tamil diaspora.
On the other hand, the desire for the negation of the LTTE's war machine must not become a license for the suppression of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka and their long unfulfilled aspiration for equality, power sharing and regional autonomy in the north and east of the country.
The ruling party headed by President Mahinda Rajapaksa initially proposed District Councils last year as the solution to the ethnic conflict and is now proposing Provincial Councils. This highlights the lack of empathy for community rights that remain as Tamil aspirations. The system of District Councils was tried in 1981 and failed and was replaced by the system of Provincial Councils in 1987 that has not succeeded either.
The other aspect that cannot be accepted is the violation of the individual rights of the Tamil people. There continue to be allegations of ransom taking and threats of kidnapping that terrify sections of the Tamil community, even those living in Colombo. A mere telephone call threatening to kidnap a family member results in money being paid as ransom.
There is a grievous lack of confidence in the ability and willingness of the police to check this type of crime among the members of the Tamil community. As a result many Tamils are said to be paying the ransom and not speaking about it to anyone. Others who feel that if they have been targeted once they will be targeted again are even leaving the country.
Trust in the institutions of governance and in those vested with positions of authority is the glue that holds society together. A government that is unwilling, or unable, to ensure the fullest protection for its law-abiding Tamil citizens is not only unworthy to govern the country, it will be unable to win the confidence of the Tamil people in its proposed political solution.
A government that is unwilling and unprepared to stop the violation of individual rights of Tamil people, even in Colombo, will not be trusted to find the way to ensuring the community rights of the Tamil people, which has been their struggle with a succession of governments for the past 60 years, since Sri Lanka received independence from the British.
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(Dr. Jehan Perera is executive director of the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, an independent advocacy organization. He studied economics at Harvard College and holds a doctorate in law from Harvard Law School. ©Copyright Jehan Perera.)
