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Lee announced his "MB Doctrine" toward the North -- the principle of strict reciprocity -- at the start of this year, explaining that it is part of his campaign commitment to work toward denuclearization and opening of the North. Under this program, South Korea would work to convert North Korea's economy into an open market system, raising personal income to US$3,000 per year -- on the condition that the North dismantles it's nuclear programs.
The shift means the Lee government could tilt toward a hard line. More specifically, it is possible South Korea will more carefully calculate what is paid in exchange for its economic aid and place limits upon that aid, depending upon the North's sincere cooperation in establishing a nuclear-free peninsula.
Although Lee has maintained a determined stance in placing the highest priority on denuclearization, there are two considerations he will have to factor in: the change of circumstances achieved by the six-party talks and the preferences of his recently converted conservative supporters in relation to the North Korea policy. Their preferences could be critical, as they were in this year's presidential election, with the potential to shape the outcome of the upcoming general election in April.
In the first place, the reciprocity principle was designed to force the North to cooperate in the denuclearization process and prevent it from taking economic aid for free. Currently, though this principle has not become meaningless, the argument for "forcing" the North has lost strength. This is not only because the country has been moving toward denuclearization, but also because any hard-line action could represent an unnecessary risk.
According to the October 2007 joint statement between North and South Korea, Pyongyang had been taking disablement measures and preparing to provide the United States with a "complete and accurate" declaration of all its nuclear programs by Dec. 31. As it turned out, the North failed to complete the full disclosure of its nuclear programs and the United States is still working on its commitments: eliminating North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism and exempting it from its Trading with the Enemy Act.
Notwithstanding those failures to meet the deadline, it seems true that the North, the United States and other members of the six-party talks will seek to avoid any possible deadlock. It is highly unlikely they will allow the current course to fail by insisting on strict timing with regard to the implementation of the commitments on both sides.
The six parties, including the United States and North Korea, will stay the course, with the long-term expectation that the North will continue to cooperate with the denuclearization process. Tom Casey, deputy spokesman for the U.S. State Department, admitted the North's complete disclosure would take "extra time." Though South Korea and Japan expressed disappointment they will not abandon the process.
When it comes to the Lee government's policy, the danger is that an inflexible stance --insisting on the North's complete nuclear dismantlement prior to South Korea's continued economic aid -- will bring greater tension and risk to the denuclearization efforts. Lee's policy, in fact, could interrupt the pace of the six-party talks. The talks place complete dismantlement as the goal at the final stage of denuclearization negotiations, after the disablement and declaration of current nuclear-related materials and facilities is completed.
Taking a hard line could cause a rupture in this process, leading to a highly undesirable deadlock at this critical moment. It may in effect freeze the six-party talks. In addition, it could be criticized as an imprudent act by the international community as well as the South Korean people.
Secondly, this presidential election has seen many voters shift their political support from the Roh government to Lee's Grand National Party. However, this is not an irreversible shift of public support. The truth is not that Lee's GNP won the people's support, but that the Roh government lost it. The shift occurred mainly as a result of liberal voters' deepening frustration with the failure of the Roh government to deal with seriously deteriorating economic inequality, not because of their ultimate change in position from advocating an engagement policy toward the North.
At no time during the presidential contest this year did the North Korea policy surface as a main driving issue. South Korean people instead paid great attention to economic issues. However, a radical departure from the current direction of North Korea policy could stir surprise among voters who favor greater movement toward a peaceful and stable Korean peninsula.
The Lee government shoulders several political burdens in adjusting its policies to the circumstances that have arisen during Roh's rein. Furthermore, Lee's plan for a Korean Peninsula Canal Project, which is placed at the core of his strategy to boost the economy, has come under serious criticism regarding its viability and environmental impact.
Lee needs to maintain public confidence to exercise his presidential power effectively in the early stages of his administration. In this regard, it is not advisable for the next government to return to a hard-line position. Jung Sae Hyun, who served as the minister of unification from 2002 to 2004, emphasized in a recent interview that such a return could seriously backfire.
Lee's approach may do nothing to further current negotiations within the six-party talks and could be self-destructive in that it could unsettle his supporters who favor the engagement policy. South Korea's president-elect should drive his North Korea policy carefully, engaging the North as well as his newly converted conservative supporters.
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(Lee Jae Young is a freelance writer and citizen reporter for Ohmynews International. He has a master's degree from Cornell University Law School in Ithaca, New York. ©Copyright Lee Jae Young.)
