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Bhutto and the current military dictator may still share power. The truth of the matter is that former and serving Pakistani generals are too friendly with the United States. Blinded by their friendship, Washington continues to play to their interests. The present mayhem would not have happened had the United States discouraged General Pervez Musharraf from seizing power in 1999.
Supporting Pakistani generals of many hues has been U.S. policy right from the 1950s when General Ayub Khan seized power. Later when General Yahya Khan ousted Ayub Khan in 1967, Washington supported Yahya Khan, resulting in the break-up of Pakistan in 1970. The United States continued its excessive association with generals when Bhutto's father was ousted and hanged by another military dictator, General Zia Ul Haq. The latter was a favorite of U.S. President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s because he allowed Pakistan to become a base for the covert U.S. war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. He received massive military aid for his support.
The present general, Pervez Musharraf, has been a U.S. favorite for the last eight years because he has again traded military aid for his support of the U.S. War on Terror in Afghanistan. Washington paid no attention to the fact that this general in unpopular. His eight years in office have been marred with violence, and on his watch al-Qaida and the Taliban have re-established themselves in Pakistani border regions.
Among the friendly Pakistani military generals and a few civilian leaders there is a group of popular serving and former military men, especially in the dreaded Inter Service Intelligence, who regard themselves as the saviors of Islam. They oppose secularism and do not wish Bhutto back. Apparently the United States forgot about this group, which publicly and privately opposes any U.S. involvement in Pakistani affairs, let alone allowing Bhutto to rule them. The elite Mohajir and political grouping of the Punjabi establishment also support this powerful group.
Currently, the United States is trying to balance two opposing ideologies by having the two sides share power -- the friendly generals, who wish to stay in power, with a popularly elected prime minister. In this way, democracy is restored and also their man stays in power. There is one caveat, that is, the forgotten bunch of ISI men. They, together with the local al-Qaida and Taliban elements, are hell-bent upon torpedoing this arrangement. In fact, they came very close to their objective on Oct. 18.
It is a pity that the people of Karachi, who were only offering a hearty welcome to Bhutto, became the victims. Emboldened, the saboteurs will not stop. They will try and try again, until they kill either the secular general or Bhutto.
If this happens, where does it leave U.S. policy? In my opinion it will head toward oblivion. U.S. policy will not be the same if either Musharraf or Bhutto loses his or her job and life violently.
The United States will have to look for new options if the present formula of power sharing does not see the light of the day. Martial law may be re-imposed by Musharraf (if he survives) or his chosen deputy. Bhutto, if she is still around, may flee the country to save her life. Democracy will be dead for a long time. The people of Pakistan may ultimately suffer.
The United States still has many cards in its hands, which it could play to control the situation. But it cannot play any of them as long as Pakistan is to be used for the War on Terror. Pakistan's role as a major source of intelligence -- though at times dubious -- on the Taliban and al-Qaida, cannot be understated. Information received so far is what kept the so-called 2007 Taliban spring offensive on NATO forces in Afghanistan in check. It has not helped to nab al-Qaida head Osama Bin Laden and his deputy, however.
What should Washington do in the event of the failure of its power-sharing proposal?
It will have to go slow on its military and economic assistance to Pakistan. If possible all the critical components of military hardware supplied to Pakistan should be kept within U.S. reach, to be taken away in case the situation worsens. This the United States did very successfully in Iran in 1979 after the fall of the Shah. The United States took away all the critical components of F-15 fighter jets, making them useless for a long time.
Also, it should reduce economic assistance and development aid. Right now Pakistan's GDP has a healthy 7 percent growth. This could drop to 3 percent if half of U.S. cash grants were withdrawn. Pakistan would be hard pressed and would not protest, since the remaining aid would still be keeping the army and civilian life afloat.
There is no easy way to control the free-roaming ISI vagabonds in Pakistan. They are the main source of secret support to al-Qaida and the Taliban. They are also the key elements identified by Bhutto as the chief culprits of the Oct 18 attack on her. Nothing can be done about them, but they should be kept in U.S. gun sights. Washington should do everything in its power to prevent the ISI and jihadis from getting closer to the nuclear button, especially the technically competent ISI.
All the nuclear weapons in Pakistan should be made un-operational. Washington would have to make the friendly generals understand that control of the nuclear button is the ultimate goal of all the jihadi elements. If this were made unavailable it would diminish the jihadi zeal for power. Right now Musharraf and his men claim that the nuclear weapons are very safe. If the safeguards are not strong enough, however, the United States, India and Israel could all become the targets of jihadi wrath.
Finally, the United States has to stop cajoling the generals. It was a huge mistake to listen to Musharraf's explanation when he grabbed power in 1999. He should have been thoroughly discouraged and forced out of power, threatened with the loss of military and economic aid.
Washington must very clearly state that the critical components of Pakistan's nuclear weapons are to be within U.S. gun sights at all times. If all hell breaks loose and anybody attempts to remove them without U.S. concurrence, then US B-2 bombers should destroy them forever.
The United States has cajoled and loved all the Pakistani generals for a long time. But current events point in the direction of upcoming mayhem in Pakistan in spite of all U.S. efforts. It is time now to stop power brokering in Pakistan. Better still, it is time to stop being friendly to the generals. It is time to cut military and economic aid.
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(Hari Sud is a retired vice president of C-I-L Inc., a former investment strategies analyst and international relations manager. A graduate of Punjab University and the University of Missouri, he has lived in Canada for the past 34 years. ©Copyright Hari Sud.)
