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The Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord was signed by the leaders of the two countries to establish a sustainable political solution. It envisaged a new political framework of devolved power for the provinces, the merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces, the disarming of the LTTE and the meeting of Indian foreign policy imperatives in relation to Sri Lanka. The agreement also saw the entry into Sri Lanka of an Indian presence in the form of a large army called the Indian Peacekeeping Force.
The present provincial council system that is operative in the country is the sole remaining legacy of the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord. If it had been implemented properly in law and in spirit it could have provided the basis for a sustainable political solution as envisaged by its architects. It could have saved the country at least 50,000 lives and led to an economy that could have generated an income stream for the people that is double that of today.
Unfortunately, from the very beginning, the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord was highly contested, with only a section of the government supporting it, and the LTTE and most of the mainstream political opposition parties opposing it.
The problem with the peace accord was that it attempted to achieve too many controversial objectives in too short a time. There was no consultation with the main actors or information supplied to the population at large. The LTTE was informed but not consulted, and muscled into the process, and no one else was either consulted or informed. It did not take long for the agreement to begin to unravel. Not even the might of the regional superpower that had stationed its battleships within sight of Colombo could compel a solution.
The desire for solutions that are imposed on others by virtue of superior power is a continuing saga in Sri Lanka. India's present reluctance to get directly and openly involved in peacemaking in Sri Lanka may stem from its own learning experience from the past. But in Sri Lanka itself the lesson does not seem to have been learned. The present strategy of the government is to impose a political solution upon a militarily weakened LTTE and a dispirited Tamil polity. The triumphant celebration that the government is conducting throughout the country is to take political advantage of its military victories.
There is no denying that the government has been more successful than anticipated in taking the military battle to the LTTE and forcing them to retreat. On the other hand, the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord shows the danger of giving priority to imposed solutions in the resolution of longstanding disputes such as the ethnic conflict. Today all the LTTE's political offices in the east have been closed and most of them replaced by cadres of the Karuna group, who work in collaboration with the government.
But this was also the situation two decades ago when the Indian Peacekeeping Force cleared the LTTE out of the east. In its place the Indian decision makers put a rival Tamil militant organization, the EPRLF, to govern the east, and even had an election carried out to legitimize the new dispensation. But this reconfiguration of power was not sustainable and it collapsed with the Indian Peacekeeping Force's withdrawal from Sri Lanka at the behest of then President Ranasinghe Premadasa. Despite the battering they had received at the hands of the Indian force, the LTTE were soon back again.
Whether the LTTE will be able to stage a similar comeback two decades later will depend on how the situation evolves. In Mutur and Vakarai, which were the scenes of battle and large-scale displacement of people, the terrible suffering among the displaced people, including the children, could be compared to the poorest parts of Africa.
In the east there is a vast reservoir of grievance that could once again lead to an LTTE comeback unless the government comes up with a hearts-and-minds strategy the likes of which Sri Lanka is yet to see.
The urgent need today, as it has been for the past two decades, is for a viable political package that can meet Tamil aspirations, a wholehearted economic development program for the north and east, and a genuine willingness to engage in peace talks with the LTTE. Unfortunately, the present government has not been able to even make a start on any one of these three essentials for sustainable peace. The future is indeed bleak for the people of Sri Lanka, especially the Tamil people in the north and east.
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(Dr. Jehan Perera is executive director of the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, an independent advocacy organization. He studied economics at Harvard College and holds a doctorate in law from Harvard Law School. ©Copyright Jehan Perera.)
