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The Rajapaksa government seems to believe in the ancient wisdom that man does not live by bread alone, and is feeding the economically deprived people of the country with a heady diet of military victories.
On the other hand, receiving scrolls is no guarantee of enduring success or an end to the war, as Sri Lanka's recent history would testify. In 1995, the man in charge of the Sri Lankan military forces, retired Col. Anuruddha Ratwatte, who subsequently received a promotion to the rank of General, also arranged for a similar scroll-receiving ceremony to announce the liberation of Jaffna from the LTTE. Undoubtedly, bringing Jaffna under government control was a major military and political achievement, as Jaffna is the effective capital of Tamil civilization in Sri Lanka. But the war against the LTTE has continued much beyond the term of Gen. Ratwatte.
Thoppigala, which unlike Jaffna is a rocky outcrop surrounded by jungle, was the last major military base of the LTTE in the east. LTTE cadres are still present in the east to harass the government, and engage in acts of guerilla violence. But the LTTE no longer controls territory in the east. With the fall of Thoppigala, the last remaining LTTE administrative center has been dismantled.
The media showed some of the less savory aspects of that administration, including small cage-like structures in which captives were kept. In addition, the homegrown courts of law, the police and the civil administration system of which the LTTE was proud, will no longer be there to give legitimacy to the LTTE's claim of separate statehood.
But there is a potential downside to this rooting out of LTTE structures. Whatever moderating influence the political wing of the LTTE might have exerted on its military wing will be reduced with the elimination of the group's administrative and political structures. An ominous indication of this possibility has already come in the form of a warning by LTTE political wing leader S. P. Thamilselvan in response to the fall of Thoppigala. He announced to the international media that the group would be attacking economic targets to cripple the strength of the government.
The LTTE may seek to boost its morale by making threats of a deadly nature, and by referring to past recoveries on their part. But on this occasion their defeat in the east is unlikely to be easily reversible on the ground. On previous occasions, such as in 1992, when the government took back full control over the east, the LTTE was able to make a comeback by stealth in succeeding months. They did not need to launch major military operations against the government forces. Instead they waited until the government had to reduce its troop concentrations in the east for tasks elsewhere, to infiltrate back and gradually take control once again.
On this occasion, however, the LTTE will face a major problem in infiltrating back to the east in any significant numbers. This is because they will have to face competition from their former comrades from the breakaway Karuna group, who are now present in the east with the support of government forces. Unlike in the past, the reduction in the government's troop levels in the east will not automatically translate into a military vacuum that the LTTE can fill.
The indications at the present time are that the government has shifted the theater of military confrontation with the LTTE from the east to the north. On the face of it, the mismatch between the conventional strengths of the government and LTTE forces will mean that the government will have the capacity to overrun the LTTE defenses in the north, as they did in the east. But the costs of such an exercise will be much higher, perhaps intolerably so, for two reasons. One, the Wanni is the stronghold of the LTTE, where government troops will face an undivided force, unlike in the east where the LTTE lost the support of the Karuna group. Second, the LTTE is likely to resort to increased terrorism in Colombo and outside of the north and east if its very existence as a politico-administrative entity in the Wanni is threatened.
It is an accepted truism in Sri Lanka today that a political solution to the ethnic conflict is necessary for sustainable peace. President Rajapaksa is the foremost verbal proponent of this view in national and international forums. The end result of the government's military assault on the LTTE-controlled Wanni might mean its recapture and the dismantling of all LTTE administrative structures in the north and east. However, the grievances of the Tamil people that gave birth to the LTTE would remain to destabilize the polity. The internationally powerful Tamil diaspora would remain a formidable foe for Sri Lanka without becoming its ally.
However, the Rajapaksa government has shown itself to be much less sensitive to human and economic costs than its predecessor governments. So far the government has not been deterred by the array of charges leveled against it with regard to human rights violations, massive corruption and misgovernance. The question is how long the Sri Lankan electorate will be prepared to bear the heavy human, economic and moral costs of the war.
While it is true that man does not live by bread alone, the government's diet of military victories is unlikely to allay the hunger in the vast majority of Sri Lankan people for economic prosperity, nonviolence in daily life and moral governance.
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(Dr. Jehan Perera is executive director of the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, an independent advocacy organization. He studied economics at Harvard College and holds a doctorate in law from Harvard Law School. © Copyright Jehan Perera.)
