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The President had promised an 'honorable peace' with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and a viable political solution to Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict within three months of attaining office. This is however, contrary to what he and his nationalist allies had previously described as the "peace bended knees" of his rival - former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. Presently, his proposals fall woefully short of anything that could go half the distance to meet the demands of the aggrieved Tamil ethnic minority, let alone the LTTE, which has been fighting for a separate state for the Tamils. Though, it is easy to fault the ruling party on its proposal, it important to understand the rationale behind it.
One must consider three difficult key issues for negotiating a settlement with Sri Lanka's ethnic Tamils. The first is to persuade the LTTE to enter mainstream democratic politics and renounce violence. The other two, which have defied a solution since Sri Lanka's independence, are territorial rights of the Tamils and the quantum of power that regional governments in Tamil controlled areas should possess. These two issues are often described as the potential devolution of the nation and the question asked is whether Sri Lanka should be a unitary or federal state.
Proponents of a negotiated settlement for the ethnic conflict have long insisted that the missing ingredient in such negotiations is the political consensus to address the nation's power sharing issues. President Rajapaksa supported this view and set up the 'All Party Conference' to develop a solution, shortly after being elected President. However, his proposals to the Conference, mid May, have disappointed and frustrated those who had hoped for a bold solution and a negotiated settlement to the Tamil problem. This is because the SLFP's proposals limit the devolution of power to the unitary state and district units.
On this issue, the Tamil polity aspires that the Northern and Eastern provinces, which constitute less than a third of Sri Lanka's territory, be considered their homeland. The Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord of 1987, and the 13th Amendment to the constitution that followed the Accord, gave a degree of legal recognition to this Tamil demand by merging the two provinces, albeit on a temporary basis. However, the Supreme Court, in 2007, de-merged the two provinces, much to the chagrin of the Tamil polity and the SLFP further proposed reductions in the unit of devolution by classifying the region a district. Hence the proposal now, not only detracts previous solutions to merge the Northern and Eastern provinces into one political unit but on the contrary breaks it into eight district units.
The second cause of disagreement to the SLFP proposal is the issue of 'central control' vested in the regional units as part of the power sharing arrangement. The SLFP asserts that powers devolved or shared should be within the framework of a unitary constitutional framework. This means that the authorities in Colombo can wield powers overriding those of the regional units, as well as retain unilateral power to alter any arrangements if and as required. This is unacceptable to the Tamil political parties who have unanimously insisted that the framework for a political solution must be a federal one, which should not involve unilateral central rule.
Until President Rajapaksa took over the leadership of the SLFP, there had been a tacit consensus for a federal solution between the two main political parties - the SLPF and the United National Party (UNP). The SLFP, headed by former President Chandrika Kumaratunga and the UNP by former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, both believed in a federal solution for the ethnic conflict. However, the current President has broken that consensus in order to preserve his alliance with the Sinhalese nationalist parties who provide him the majority in Parliament, to be in power.
The perceived thought is that the President feels the current scenario is not conducive to a settlement with the LTTE and such a possibility is virtually nonexistent given the legendary rigidity of the LTTE. His strategy of pragmatism has been to do all possible to stay in power, in the short term. It can be further assessed that the President needs the support of the Sinhalese nationalist forces to stay in power and hence cannot alienate himself from them. However, as much as he hangs on their fledging support, he also hopes that the Sri Lankan military forces reduce the ability of the LTTE to be an obstacle to political solutions.
To view the SLFP's present stance as reflecting long-term rigidity on possible solutions to the ethnic conflict, might be wrong. The President's current political posturing may keep the Sinhalese factions on his side, albeit on a temporary basis. However, this short-term pragmatism has started eroding the confidence of others in the President's capacity of moral commitment and his capability to solve this problem. Winning elections and holding on to power is one thing; winning the trust of others and solving intractable problems, is another.
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(Jehan Perera is presently the executive director of the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, an independent advocacy organization. He studied economics at Harvard College and holds a doctorate in law from Harvard Law School.)
